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ABSTRACT 
Although the overall number of piracy incidents has decreased over the past few years, almost 
half the incidents that are reported, involve energy carrying vessels. Given the important role that 
energy plays in society and the fact that approximately 90% of the world’s energy is transported 
by sea, an adequate framework is essential to ensure energy security. To determine whether the 
current framework is sufficient, a survey of all the relevant international, regional and domestic 
instruments is conducted. What becomes evident is that there are no provisions that relate 
specifically to energy carrying vessels. Energy carrying vessels are used to carry valuable cargo, 
they are large and slow moving, they travel specific routes and are manned with few crew. For 
those reasons, energy carrying vessels require additional protections to bridge their 
vulnerabilities. The need is emphasized by the vast negative effects an attack on an energy 
carrying vessel can have, which threatens the environment, the economy and the safety and 
security of crew. A key instrument focusing on maritime energy security is the Luanda 
Declaration on Maritime and Energy Security (Luanda Declaration). The Luanda Declaration is 
an African initiative with a regional application. The declaration, however, is merely a guideline 
and is not binding. The continued high number of incidents affecting energy carrying vessels 
shows that states have not taken sufficient positive steps in accordance with the Luanda 
Declaration and that the current framework is insufficient to ensure maritime energy security.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
On the morning of Saturday the 15th November 2008, Somali pirates made news 
headlines when they attacked the Liberian flagged MV Sirius Star, a very-large crude 
carrier (VLCC) spanning 333 metres in length and 60 metres in beam.1 With a 
deadweight tonnage (DWT) of 319 430 tons, the super tanker was carrying 
approximately 2 million barrels of crude oil and was en route to the United States of 
America when armed pirates boarded the vessel over 450 nautical miles off the southeast 
coastline of Mogadishu.2 The 25 crewmembers on board were taken hostage and the 
vessel was anchored off the Somali coast while negotiations took place.3 A reported 
ransom of US$3 million was paid and the vessel was released in January 2009.4 This 
incident demonstrated the advanced technique and precision used by pirates and stands 
out for two reasons: first, it was the largest ship to ever be seized by pirates at that time, 
and second, it was the farthest out to sea Somali pirates had ever struck. 
Piracy has plagued the oceans since the beginning of trade and the MV Sirius Star is 
only one example of numerous pirate attacks that occur each year. In 2000, there was a 
drastic upsurge in the number of pirate attacks, which increased from 300 in the previous 
                                            
1 ‘VLCC hijacked by pirates’ International Chambers of Commerce (ICC) Commercial Crime Services 
(CCS), 18 November 2008 available at https://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php/news/349-vlcc-hijacked-by-
pirates, accessed on 25 March 2017. 
2 Ibid 
3 ICC-IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the period 1 January – 31 December 2008 
pg. 56. 
4 C Liss ‘The maritime dimension of energy security’ in B K Sovacool (ed) The Routledge Handbook of 
Energy Security (2011) 122. 
 2 
year to 469.5 In 2003 and in 2009 to 2011 the number of pirate attacks spiked once again, 
as depicted in figure 1 below. This upsurge was a major concern to the international 
community which reacted quickly, by: 
i. Improving the relevant legal framework  
At the time of the resurgence of piracy, the legal framework in place was 
inadequate to combat the fierce and sophisticated tactics used by modern pirates.  
Piracy of this magnitude had never existed in the past and there was only one 
international convention, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
1982 (UNCLOS) that included provisions on piracy. UNCLOS proved to be 
inadequate because most of the crimes committed fell outside of its scope, which 
resulted in states not having the necessary jurisdiction to take action. This was due 
to the definition of piracy as set out in UNCLOS and will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 3. UNCLOS merely establishes jurisdiction and sets out certain 
rights and obligations on states parties. These obligations are phrased in such a 
way as to not be too onerous on states and it therefore fails to clearly obligate 
states to prosecute pirates and ensure that their domestic legislation is sufficient to 
act in accordance with international jurisdiction. In an attempt to fill the apparent 
gaps in the legal framework further Conventions, such as the Convention for the 
Suppressions on Unlawful Acts against Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988 
(SUA Convention) and the 2005 Protocol were created. Further, various 
Resolutions were passed by the United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC) and 
                                            
5 ‘ Number of cases of piracy and armed robbery against ships worldwide from 1998 to 2016’ Statista 
available at https://www.statista.com/statistics/262930/piracy-and-armed-robbery-against-ships-since-
1998/, accessed on 7 May 2017. 
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General Assembly (GA) as well as the International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO).6  
 
ii. Implementing vessel hardening tactics  
Due to the continued increase of piracy during 2000 to 2012, it became apparent 
that ships could no longer rely on purely external forces to prevent piracy and as a 
result the focus turned to internal mechanisms to prevent piracy. The international 
maritime community introduced the Best Management Practices7 (BMP) which 
sets out various passive defense measures and includes ship hardening tactics 
such as fencing ships with razor wire or electric fencing, increasing security on 
board, improving watch keeping, enhancing protection of the ships bridge and 
other weak or targeted areas, making use of water sprays and foam monitors, 
using alarm systems and Closed Circuit Television (CCTV), improving lighting, 
ensuring that tools, equipment, weapons and valuables are kept in secured rooms 
or safes that cannot be easily accessed by pirates and having a safe place/Citadel 
for the Master and crew to hide out in when under attack.8 
 
iii. Increasing the use of private security by ship owners 
Previously, the use of armed guards on board ships was a rare occurrence due to 
various difficulties. Some of which complexities exist due to the cross-border 
nature of maritime trade as ships will be required to abide by the laws and 
                                            
6 The relevant Resolutions will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
7 The latest version of the Best Management Practices is available at http://eunavfor.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2013/01/bmp4-low-res_sept_5_20111.pdf, accessed on 6 May 2017. 
8 Albatross Ltd. ‘Ship Protections Measures’ available at http://mscalbatross.com/ship-protection-measures, 
accessed on 6 May 2017. 
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regulations of each state whose territorial waters they enter.  Apart from those 
difficulties, the lack of framework relating to the use of private armed security has 
resulted in uncertainty and it is unclear in what circumstances force can be used 
and the degree of force justified. However, in February 2011 the International 
Chamber of Shipping (ICS) declared its change of view with regards to the use of 
private armed guards.9 The popularity of this practice rapidly increased and 
according to an article published in The Maritime Executive at least 80% of 
container ships and tankers make use of armed guards.10 Private security 
companies claim to be the largest contributory factor to the decrease in pirate 
attacks.11 Yet, the use of armed guards remains a highly controversial topic due to 
“frequent reports of security contractors’ impunity for … human rights abuses, 
criminal misconduct, or aggressive behaviour.”12 That being said, the controversy 
of this topic goes beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
 
iv. Increasing security at sea  
In an attempt to combat piracy and secure shipping lanes certain states, such as 
China,13 have deployed military forces to hot spot areas14 while other states have 
                                            
9 Ince & Co ‘Piracy: Issues arising from the use of armed guards’ available at 
https://www.skuld.com/upload/Publications/Piracy/Ince_Piracy-issues-arising-from-the-use-of-armed-
guards.pdf, accessed on 18 September 2017. 
10 ‘Armed Guards Now Deployed on 80% of Container Ships, Tankers’ The Maritime Executive 18 
September 2013 available at http://maritime-executive.com/pressrelease/Armed-Guards-Deployed-
Container-Ships-Tankers-2013-09-18, accessed on 6 May 2017. 
11 ‘Repelling pirate attacks: the measures to protect a ship’ The Telegraph 10 February 2014 available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/culture/captain-phillips-film/10367534/security-against-pirate-
attacks.html, accessed on 6 May 2017. 
12 E. L. Gaston ‘Mercenarism 2.0? The rise of the modern private security industry and its implications for 
international humanitarian law enforcement’ (2008) 49(1) Harvard International Law Journal 221 – 248 at 
pg. 121. 
13 ‘China begins anti-piracy mission’ BBC News 26 December 2008 available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7799899.stm, accessed on 7 May 2017. 
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joined forces to combat piracy. Some examples are Operation MALSINDO, a 
joint operation between Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia,15 the Combined 
Maritime Forces (CMF), is a joint operation between 31 member nations16 with 
Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150) focused on maritime security and 
Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) focused on counter-piracy. International 
Organisations have further created various task forces, some of which include the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Operation Ocean Shield and the 
European Union Operation Atlanta.17 
 
v. Creating private non-governmental organisations  
States actors alone could not fight the epidemic and the international maritime 
community had to act jointly.  Several non-governmental organisations (NGO’s) 
tasked with combating piracy have been formed over the past years and some of 
which include the International Chambers of Commerce (ICC) International 
Maritime Bureau (IMB), Oceans Beyond Piracy, a program of the One Earth 
Future Foundation18 and The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somali. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
14 According to the International Chambers of Commerce, Commercial Crime Services hot spot areas 
include South East Asia and the Indian Sub-Continent, Africa and the Red Sea and South and Central 
America and the Caribbean Waters. Available at https://icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/prone-areas-
and-warnings, accessed on 7 May 2017. 
15 P. S. Anabraba Multinational counter-piracy operations: how strategically significant is the Gulf of 
Guinea to the major maritime powers? (Unpublished M.Sc thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015)  
16 Member states include Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iraq, 
Italy, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Pakistan, The Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, UAE, 
United Kingdom, United States and Yemen. Available at https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/about/, 
accessed on 7 May 2017. 
17 L. R. Blank ‘Rules of engagement and legal frameworks for multinational counter-piracy operations’ 
(2013) 46(1) & (2) Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 397 – 409 at pg. 397 & 398. 
18 J N Mak ‘NGO’s, piracy and maritime crime in Southeast Asia’ (2013) Centre for Security Studies 
available at http://isnblog.ethz.ch/international-relations/ngos-piracy-and-maritime-crime-in-southeast-asia, 
accessed on 7 May 2017. 
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vi. Promoting and improving information gathering and sharing 
Due to the fact that there are numerous actors involved in the fight against piracy, 
information sharing is vital for co-operation and success. In fact, there is a duty on 
states to co-operate in the repression of piracy19 and therefore it has been argued 
that there is a duty on states to share information that is not classified.20 Some 
examples of information gathering and sharing initiatives are the Shared 
Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE), which is a forum for military 
commanders of counter-piracy operations which is dedicated to the exchange of 
information relevant to combating piracy,21 the Regional Cooperation Agreement 
on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) 
which created an information sharing centre in Singapore and further Codes 
which establish information sharing centres, such as the Djibouti Code of 
Conduct.22 
All of the above have led to a decrease in pirate attacks and according to the ICC 
IMB 2016 annual piracy report, 2016 had the least number of pirate attacks reported 
over the past decade. However, although the overall number of attacks has decreased, 
energy carrying vessels appear to be at risk as nearly half the attacks that occurred 
                                            
19 Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) states “All States shall 
cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place 
outside the jurisdiction of any State” and Article 13 of the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety 
of Maritime Navigation (SUA) 1988 states that “States Parties shall co-operate in the prevention of the 
offences set forth in article 3 […]”. 
20 Y Gottlieb ‘Combating maritime piracy: inter-disciplinary cooperation’s and information sharing’ (2013) 
46(1) & (2) Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 303 – 333 at page 304 & 305. 
21 European Union Institute for Security Studies (Report No 20) Fighting piracy off the Coast of Somalia: 
Lessons learnt from the contact group (2014) pg. 16. 
22 Y Gottlieb (2013) supra at n.20. 
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during 2016 involved energy carrying vessels.23 Further, we are yet to see what 2017 
holds considering Somali pirates carried out their first successful attack since 2012 on 
the MT Aris 13, a Bunkering Tanker. During the first quarter of 201724 there have 
been a total of 43 attacks, 18 of which involved energy carrying vessels.+ 25 It is 
noteworthy that the total number of attacks for the first quarter of 2017 has increased 
by 6 incidents compared to the first quarter of 2016, which had a total of 37 attacks.26 
The high number of incidents involving energy carrying vessels and the consequential 
threat to energy security, the environment and the safety of crew is a great concern 
and a basis to study the relevant framework to establish whether it is sufficient. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
23 ICC-IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the period 1 January - 31 December 
2016. 
24 The first quarter is from 1 January 2017 to 31 March 2017 
25 ICC-IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the period 1 January – 31 March 2017 
26 Ibid. 
Figure 1: Number of cases of piracy and armed robbery against ships worldwide from 
1998 to 2016 (Source: Statista) 
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2. AIM AND OBJECTIVE 
There are various contributory factors to the high number of attacks on energy 
carrying vessels, such as, the high value of the cargo and the specialised vessel, which 
can be used to procure a high ransom. For example, the ransom paid for the release of the 
MV Sirius Star was US$3 million.  When compared to the value of the ship, which was 
approximately US$150 million and to the value of the cargo, which was approximately 
US$100 million, the ransom paid was a relatively small price to pay for the safe return of 
the vessel, cargo and crew.27 Energy carrying vessels may also be more susceptible to 
attack because of their structure, speed and specific routes travelled which make them 
vulnerable and therefore easier targets.28 As stated by Palmer, “their slow speeds and low 
freeboards, when laden, makes these huge ships very vulnerable.”29  
This dissertation will provide a study of the above-mentioned vulnerabilities of 
energy carrying vessels and assesses the legal framework in place, including the 
international conventions and regional instruments, as well as industry guidelines and 
recommendations. This dissertation will also survey relevant literature to further assist in 
recognising any gaps that may exist in the legal framework applicable to energy carrying 
vessels. The aim of the study is to establish whether the framework takes into 
consideration those vulnerabilities and provides a sufficient framework to ensure energy 
security. This dissertation will highlight the adequacy of the framework and point out any 
deficiencies and shortcomings.  
                                            
27 C Liss ‘The maritime dimension of energy security’ in B K Sovacool (ed) The Routledge Handbook of 
Energy Security (2011) 122 
28 ‘Threats to oil transport’ Institute for the Analysis of Global Shipping available at 
http://www.iags.org/oiltransport.html, accessed on 7 May 2017. 
29 A Palmer The New Pirates: Modern Global Piracy from Somalia to the South China Sea (2014) 148 
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3. PARAMETERS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This dissertation will specifically focus on security on board energy carrying vessels 
and will not be concerned with security of pipelines used to transport energy sources or 
offshore oil platforms. It will focus solely on the framework in place, which is applicable 
to energy carrying vessels. It will not take into account various factors that affect the 
implementation of the framework, for example, various states, more specifically African 
states, are rife with corruption and civil and political tension, and are unable to effectively 
implement the framework. This however falls outside the ambit of this dissertation. 
Further, this dissertation does not take into account the difficulty in creating binding 
provisions that are acceptable to most states. Different states have different cultures, 
ideologies and political systems and it is extremely difficult to provide for all states so 
that an instrument will be widely adopted. Also, states are hesitant to adopt instruments 
that are too onerous. Further, it does not provide an analysis of the root causes of piracy 
and permanent solutions. Further, energy carrying vessels are susceptible to many perils 
when out at sea, such as natural and navigational perils, terrorists and piracy. This 
dissertation will only focus on piracy and the applicable legal framework in place to 
combat it. Although the laws of an act of piracy and acts of armed robbery against ships 
is different, for the purpose of the dissertation, the term “piracy” includes armed robbery 
as defined by Resolution A.1025 (26) of the IMO.30 The above limitations are complex 
                                            
30 Article 101 of The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982 defines piracy as 
follows: 
Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by 
the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:  
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board 
such ship or aircraft;  
 10 
and fall outside the scope of this dissertation. The aim of this dissertation is solely to 
establish what framework is in place and whether it was sufficient. 
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This dissertation will be based on desktop research of all relevant primary resources 
such as Conventions, protocols, official reports and statistics as well as secondary 
resources such as books, journals and media reports and it will include a qualitative 
review of relevant secondary sources by analysing, discussing and comparing them. This 
dissertation will not include empirical research or quantitative research, save for an 
analysis of various reports and statistics, which have been published. 
5. STRUCTURE 
This dissertation consists of five chapters. The current chapter is an introduction, 
setting out the background of the topic, the aims and objectives of this dissertation, the 
parameters of the research and the research methodology used.  
Chapter two is a contextual chapter setting out the definition of maritime energy 
security, the different types of energy carrying vessels, their size and other specifications. 
                                                                                                                                  
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any 
State;  
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of 
facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;  
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b). 
The IMO defines piracy as those acts contained in article 101 of UNCLOS and further defines “armed 
robbery against ships” as: 
1. any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an 
act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against persons or 
property on board such a ship, within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters and 
territorial sea; 
2. any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above.30 
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This chapter will further look at the commodity carried, various chokepoints situated 
around the globe which are commonly traversed by energy carrying vessels, as well as 
other high-risk areas, ship vulnerability and the possible dangers that could result from an 
attack.  
Chapter three sets out the international framework in place focusing on the three main 
conventions applicable to piracy. These include the UNCLOS, the SUA Convention and 
the 2005 Protocol and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 
(SOLAS Convention). It will analyse those frameworks by identifying provisions that 
apply specifically to energy carrying vessels to determine whether there are sufficient and 
adequate provisions to combat the high rate of attacks on these special vessels. 
Chapter 4 provides a study of the regional framework and industry regulations, as 
well as international provisions that have a regional application. This chapter focuses on 
the framework in South East Asia and West and East Africa as these areas are most 
affected by piracy. The regional framework will cover various instruments, some of 
which are ReCAAP, the ReCAAP Guide for Tankers Operating in Asia Against Piracy 
and Armed Robbery Involving Oil Cargo Theft (ReCAAP Guidelines), the Code of 
Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the 
Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (Djibouti Code of Conduct), the Best 
Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy (BMP), the 
Guidelines for Owners, Operators and Masters for Protection Against Piracy in the Gulf 
of Guinea Region (version 2, June 2016) (the  GoG Guidelines), the 2050 Africa’s 
Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIMS), The Luanda Declaration on Maritime and 
Energy Security (Luanda Declaration), the African Charter on Maritime Security Safety 
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and Development in Africa (the Lomé Charter) and The Code of Conduct Concerning the 
Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against Ships, Illicit Maritime Activity in West 
and Central Africa (the Yaoundé Declaration). 
Finally, chapter five contains an analysis of the findings of previous chapters and 
concludes this dissertation in finding that the international framework is insufficient to 
ensure energy security as it fails to take into consideration the inherent vulnerabilities of 
energy carrying vessels. This dissertation will show that an African initiative, the Luanda 
Declaration, provides an optimistic framework for energy security; however, it merely 
lays the foundation for states to take the necessary steps and promulgate domestic laws to 
achieve energy security. 
 
 13 
CHAPTER 2: UNDERSTANDING MARITIME ENERGY SECURITY 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Thousands of energy carrying vessels travel the seas each day transporting more than 
half of the world’s energy across the globe.31 At sea, these giants must travel through 
pirate high-risk areas while laden with valuable cargo and are slow moving and low to 
the water when fully loaded. Their cargo offers a profitable return to pirates and therefore 
they make alluring targets. On 13 February 2015, eight armed pirates boarded the MT 
Lapin with one goal in mind, stealing her fuel cargo. Once the crew had been taken 
hostage another pirate ship was brought alongside the MT Lapin. All of her fuel oil cargo 
and some of her bunker oil were siphoned from her tankers to the pirate ship alongside 
her. The pirates fled once their job was complete.32 The MT Lapin is only one example of 
several attacks using a similar modus operandi33 and provides evidence that energy 
carrying vessels are in fact being targeted for their cargo. Attacks on energy carrying 
vessels threaten both energy security and maritime security and have rippling 
consequences, affecting not only ship and cargo owners but also states and end users 
worldwide.  
This chapter will set out the definition of maritime energy security by looking at the 
meaning of energy security and maritime security and by explaining how those two 
concepts are interlinked, forming the concept of maritime energy security. Although 
                                            
31 B Wilson, ‘Maritime Energy Security’ (2012) NATO SPS sponsored Critical Energy Infrastructure 
Protection (CEIP) Advanced Research Workshop (NATO ARW) in 2012 in Ankara, Turkey available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2229989 accessed on 8 May 2017. 
32 International Chamber Of Commerce (ICC) International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy and Armed 
Robbery Against Ships Report for the period 1 January – 31 December 2015 at 22. 
33 ‘Pirates steal fuel from Malaysian-flagged tanker’ World Maritime News 18 May 2015 available at 
http://worldmaritimenews.com/archives/161131/pirates-steal-fuel-from-malaysian-flagged-tanker/, 
accessed on 8 May 2017. 
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maritime energy security is concerned with the security of all things related to energy at 
sea, this dissertation will only focus on security on board energy carrying vessels. It 
follows that this chapter will explain what is meant by the term ‘energy carrying vessel’ 
and for the purpose of elucidation, will set out the different types of energy carrying 
vessels, their sizes and other specifications. Energy carrying vessels travel along very 
specific routes leading them through chokepoints situated around the globe. This chapter 
will set out all the major chokepoints around the globe, the quantity of oil that passes 
through each chokepoint and the degree of risk faced by energy carrying vessels when 
transiting each chokepoint. Other high-risk areas will also be discussed. These specific 
routes and high-risk areas are a major vulnerability of energy carrying vessels as well 
their size, speed and their few crewmembers. This chapter will discuss these 
vulnerabilities to establish what factors set these vessels apart from other vessels and it 
will therefore highlight weaknesses that may require improved legislation and further 
security. Lastly, this chapter will analyse the various potential consequences of attacks on 
energy carrying vessels in order to emphasize the importance of security on board energy 
carrying vessels. 
2. KEY CONCEPTS: ENERGY SECURITY IN THE MARITIME CONTEXT 
In order to understand what is meant by maritime energy security one must first 
understand several different terms. Firstly, the term energy refers to natural resources 
such as petroleum, coal, gas, wind, water, nuclear fuel and oil and which is used to create 
electricity, heat,34 and power transport systems. For the purposes of this dissertation, 
                                            
34 N Webster Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English Language unabridged 2 ed 
(1979) 601. 
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energy refers to crude oil and its by-products, coal and gas, which are transported by sea. 
Energy has been described as the “lifeblood of society because of the essential role it 
plays in sustaining life on earth.”35 Secondly, energy security relates to the availability of 
natural energy resources and is defined by the International Energy Agency (IEA) as the 
“uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price.”36 Approximately 
90% of the world’s energy is transported by sea and therefore, the free and safe 
movement of energy at sea is essential to ensure energy security.37 In essence, maritime 
energy security is energy security within the maritime domain. The third term that must 
be understood is maritime security. Maritime security does not have a universally agreed 
definition;38 however, two predominant definitions have evolved over the years, namely, 
a positive definition and a negative definition.39 The former defines maritime security as a 
positive state that should be achieved by maritime security; for example, a “good or 
stable order at sea”40, while the latter defines it by the absence of named threats that exist 
within the maritime domain.41 The 2008 UN Secretary General’s Report on Oceans and 
the Law of the Sea sets out specific threats, which the absence of can be used to define 
maritime security, namely, piracy and armed robbery against ships, terrorist acts 
involving shipping, offshore installations and other maritime interests, illicit trafficking in 
arms and weapons of mass destruction, illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
                                            
35 Institute of Energy Research Energy Overview available at 
http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/topics/encyclopedia/energy-overview/ accessed on 20 April 2016. 
36 International Energy Agency What is Energy Security? available at 
http://www.iea.org/topics/energysecurity/subtopics/whatisenergysecurity/ accessed on 20 April 2016. 
37 R Herbert-Burns ‘Tankers, specialized production vessels and offshore terminal: vulnerability and 
security in the international maritime oil sector’ in R Herbert-Burns… et al (ed) Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of 
Maritime Security (2009) 142. 
38 United Nations General Assembly Secretary General’s Report on Oceans and the Law of the Sea (10 
March 2008) A/63/63, see also A/70/74Add.1. 39 C Bueger ‘What is maritime security?’ (2015) 53(1) Marine Policy 159 – 164 at 159. 
40 Ibid 159. 
41 Ibid 159. 
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substances, smuggling and trafficking of persons by sea, illegal, unreported and 
unregulated fishing and intentional and unlawful damage to the marine environment.42 
The Lomé Charter defines maritime security to mean “the prevention of and fight against 
all acts or threats of illicit acts against a ship, its crew and its passengers or against the 
port facilities, maritime infrastructure, maritime facilities and maritime environment”.43 
In light of the above definitions, maritime energy security refers to the security of 
energy within the maritime domain, which includes the transport of energy sources by 
ship or pipeline, the protection of platforms and oilrigs at sea and other infrastructure 
related to energy, to ensure the uninterrupted availability of energy sources. Liss states, 
“Many countries around the world today rely on (imported) oil, gas and other energy 
resources transported by sea. This makes the safety of shipping and sea lines of 
communications (SLOC) crucially important, linking maritime security closely to energy 
security.”44  
3. ENERGY CARRYING VESSELS 
The term ‘energy carrying vessels’ refers to ships which are used to transport 
energy sources across the ocean and which vary depending on the energy source being 
carried and include oil tankers, bulk carriers and gas carriers. These vessels make up a 
large portion of the worlds fleet and in 2016 oil tankers accounted for 27.9% of the 
world’s fleet, gas carriers accounted for 3.0%, chemical tankers accounted for 2.5% and 
                                            
42 United Nations General Assembly op cit note 8. 
43 African Union, The African Charter on Maritime Security, Safety and Development in Africa, 15 October 
2016, available at https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/33128-treaty-0060_-_lome_charter_e.pdf, 
accessed on 9 January 2017. 
44 C Liss ‘The maritime dimension of energy security’ in B.K. Sovacool (ed) The Routledge Handbook of 
Energy Security (2010) 113. 
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bulk carriers accounted for 43.1%, of which a smaller percentage would be used for 
transporting coal.45 Energy is transported on energy carrying vessels from production 
sites to refineries and finally to points of consumption and in 2016, 1930 million metric 
tons of the world’s crude oil was transported by sea.46 This amounts to nearly 90% of the 
world’s oil, which is transported by sea on energy carrying vessels. In 2015 oil and gas 
shipping alone accounted for 29.3% of global maritime trade.47 Main bulk commodities 
accounted for 29.4%48 of global maritime trade of which coal accounted for about 27.7% 
of that.49 This emphasises the importance of energy carrying vessels and the transport of 
energy by sea.  
Energy carrying vessels are large and slow moving and as stated by Jenkins, 
“except for their size and inherent strength, these things are virtually unprotected.”50 
Similarly, Patrick states, “oil tankers are highly vulnerable to pirates, who could 
potentially disrupt global energy supplies.”51 Herbert-Burns states that that some inherent 
vulnerabilities include “limitations in speed, manoeuvrability, visual blind spots, radar 
sector-blanking astern and on the quarters for both S and X bands (particularly for tankers 
with large funnel casings), low freeboards (when laden), dangerous cargoes 
                                            
45 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Review of Maritime Transport 2016 
(November 2016) at 6 table 1.3. 
46 Statista ‘Transport volume of crude oil in global seaborne trade from 2010 to 2016’ available at 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/264013/transport-volume-of-crude-oil-in-seaborne-trade/, accessed on 2 
September 2017. 
47 UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 2016 op cit note 15. 
48 Ibid. 49 Statista ‘Transport volume of coal in global seaborne trade from 2010 to 2015 (in million metric tons)’ 
available at https://www.statista.com/statistics/264017/global-seaborne-trade-of-coal-since-1985/ accessed 
on 9 January 2017. 
50 B M Jenkins ‘A chronology of terrorist attacks and other criminal actions against maritime targets’ 
(S1983 P-6906) The Rand Paper Series (1983) at 4. 
51 S Patrick Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats and International Security (2011) 160. 
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(flammable/toxic), and small crews.”52 Not all authors share the view that tankers are 
vulnerable and on the other hand, Luciani states, “… it is clear that crude oil tankers (and 
LNG tankers) are among the least vulnerable categories of ships transiting the strait.”53 
The researcher tends to agree with the views of Jenkins, Patrick and Herbert-Burns and 
believes that energy-carrying vessels are vulnerable and therefore susceptible to attack. 
This is supported by the fact that in 2016 nearly half of the reported attacks, 42.4%, were 
on energy carrying vessels.54 This includes attacks on bunkering tankers, chemical 
tankers, product tankers, crude oil tankers, liquefied natural gases (LNG) tankers and 
liquefied petroleum gases (LPG) tankers but excludes coal carrying bulk carriers as it is 
unclear how many of the 52 bulk carriers that were attacked were carrying coal. In the 
first quarter of 2017 that trend continued and 42% of the attacks that occurred were on 
energy carrying vessels. The particulars of each vessel type will be discussed briefly 
below and will include the commodity carried, the various sizes, weight and special 
features. 
3.1 Oil tankers 
 Tankers are designed specifically for transporting liquid cargos in large 
quantities55 and more specifically, oil tankers are used to transport crude oil and refined 
products from points of extraction to refineries and end users. The term ‘oil tanker’ is 
defined in the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 
                                            
52 R Herbert-Burns op cit at note 7 at 146. 
53 G Luciana ‘Restrictions of passage, accidents and oil transportation norms: impact on supply security’ 
Working Document, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies (2011). 
54 ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the period 1 January – 31 December 
2016 at 7. 
55 Rodrigo ‘Bulk carrier and oil tanker ship construction’ (2012) The Write Pass Journal available at 
https://writepass.com/journal/2012/12/bulk-carrier-and-oil-tanker-ship-construction/, accessed on 13 May 
2017. 
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as modified by the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL 73/78) as “a ship constructed or adapted 
primarily to carry oil in bulk in its cargo spaces and includes combination carriers and 
any “chemical tanker” as defined in Annex II of the present Convention when it is 
carrying a cargo or part cargo of oil in bulk.”56 According to MARPOL 73/78, ‘oil’ 
means “petroleum in any form including crude oil, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse and refined 
products (other than those petrochemicals which are subject to the provisions of Annex II 
of the present convention)...”57 Oil tankers can broadly be categorised as crude oil tankers 
and product tankers.58 
Crude oil tankers are defined as “an oil tanker engaged in the trade of carrying 
crude oil”59 and are predominantly used to transport unrefined crude oil from oil 
platforms to refineries.60 Crude oil is defined as “any liquid hydrocarbon mixture 
occurring naturally in the earth whether or not treated to render it suitable for 
transportation and includes: (a) crude oil from which certain distillate fractions may have 
been removed; and (b) crude oil to which certain distillate fractions may have been 
added.”61 Oil tankers can be categorised according to the following sizes, however, these 
sizes may vary slightly and they are not strictly applicable to oil tankers only: 
i. Panamax tanker ranging from 50 000 to 75 000 DWT;62 
                                            
56 The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 as modified by the 
Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL 73/78) Annex I at 67. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid 69. 
60 Maritime Connector ‘Oil tankers’ available at http://maritime-connector.com/oil-tanker/, accessed on 3 
September 2017. 
61 MARPOL 73/78 Annex I op cit note 26 at 69. 
62 DWT (dead-weight tonne) refers to a measure (normally in metric tons) of a ship’s carrying capacity, 
including bunker oil, fresh water, crew and provisions. 
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ii. Aframax (Average Freight Rate Assessment) tanker ranging from 80 000 to 120 
000 DWT; 
iii. Suezmax tanker ranging from 120 000 to 200 000 DWT; 
iv. Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) ranging from 200 000 to 320 000 DWT; and 
v. Ultra Large Crude Carrier (ULCC) ranging from 320 000 to 550 000 DWT.63 
Usually the route travelled and the quantity to be carried will determine the size of the 
vessel that will be used. Due to the large scale of production at oilrigs, crude oil tankers 
are required to carry large amounts of crude oil and are usually VLCC’s and ULCC’s, 
also referred to as supertankers. ULCC’s have diminished in popularity due to the fact 
that very few ports, canals and passages can accommodate their large size and at present 
only two ULCC’s are still in operation.64 Nevertheless, crude oil carriers are still among 
the largest ships at sea and are and known as “the giants of the sea”.65 
Product tankers are defined as “an oil tanker engaged in the trade of carrying oil 
other than crude oil”66 and are used to transport refined petroleum products67 from 
refineries to end users. Product tankers are usually smaller than crude oil tankers but are 
more complex as they are required to transport various different petroleum products of 
                                            
63 China Classification Society (GD26-2013) Survey Guidelines for Oil Tankers in Service (2014) at 2. 
64 J Shaw ‘The world’s biggest ships’ (2016) 34(11) Pacific Maritime Magazine available at 
http://www.pacmar.com/story/2016/11/01/features/the-worlds-biggest-ships/466.html, accessed on 3 
September 2017. 
65 T Akaki The Transportation of Oil by Sea (2011) 89. 
66 MARPOL 73/78 Annex I op cit note 26 at 69. 
67 According to the US EIA Petroleum products “are obtained from the processing of crude oil (including 
lease condensate), natural gas, and other hydrocarbon compounds. Petroleum products include unfinished 
oils, liquefied petroleum gases, pentanes plus, aviation gasoline, motor gasoline, naphtha-type jet fuel, 
kerosene-type jet fuel, kerosene, distillate fuel oil, residual fuel oil, petrochemical feedstock’s, special 
naphtha’s, lubricants, waxes, petroleum coke, asphalt, road oil, still gas, and miscellaneous products.” See 
EIA Petroleum and other Liquids available at 
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/TblDefs/pet_move_ptb_tbldef2.asp, accessed on 3 September 2017. 
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different grades, nature and consistency.68 Petroleum tankers can be categorised 
according to the following sizes: 
i. GP (General Purpose) ranging from 10 000 to 25 000 DWT; 
ii. MR (Medium Range) ranging from 25 000 to 45 000 DWT; 
iii. LR1 (Long Range 1) ranging from 45 000 to 80 000 DWT; and 
iv. LR2 (Long Range 2) ranging from 80 000 to 160 000 DWT.69  
The LR1 and LR2 product tanker size overlaps with the Panamax, Aframax, and 
Suezmax crude oil carriers and the main difference between them is the coating used on 
the tanks.70 Further, the MR, LR1, Aframax and LR2 sizes can generally be used for both 
crude oil and refined products provided the vessel meets the necessary requirements for 
the carriage of both products as required by MARPOL Annex 1, which sets out various 
structural and other requirements that these vessels must comply with.71 
Tankers can travel at speeds between 10 – 18 knots, but usually average a speed 
of about 12 knots, depending on the size of the vessel, whether the vessel is fully or 
partly laden, the age of the vessel, the weather and ocean current.72 The number of crew 
on board a tanker will depend on various factors73 and can range from approximately 8 to 
                                            
68 R Herbert-Burns op cit at note 7 at 145. 
69 Fearnley Consultants AS The Product Tanker Segment available at 
http://www.torm.com/uploads/media_items/fearnleys-industry-section.original.pdf, accessed on 3 
September 2017. 
70 Ibid. 
71 China Classification Society op cit note 33 at 2. 
72 Shippipedia ‘Tanker’ available at http://www.shippipedia.com/ships/ship-types/tanker/, accessed on 13 
May 2017. 
73 According to IMO Resolution A.1047 (27) on Principles of minimum safe manning the following factors 
should be taken into account: (1) size of the ship; (2) number, size and type of main propulsion units and 
auxiliaries; (3) level of ship automation; (4) construction and equipment of the ship; (5) method of 
maintenance used; (6) cargo to be carried; (7) frequency of port calls, length and nature of voyages to be 
undertaken; (8) trading area(s), water and operations in which the ship is involved; (9) extent to which 
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25 crewmembers.74 The speed, structure and small number of crew all contribute to the 
vulnerability of tankers and other energy carrying vessels discussed below and will be 
discussed in more detail under section 5 on ship vulnerability. 
3.2 Bulk carriers 
Bulk carriers, often called the “workhorses of the international fleet”,75 are used to 
transport large quantities of dry bulk cargo. A bulk carrier is defined in SOLAS as “a 
ship which is constructed generally with single deck, top-side tanks and hopper side tanks 
in cargo spaces, and is intended primarily to carry dry cargo in bulk, and includes such 
types as ore carriers and combination carriers.”76 However, this definition was revised by 
MSC.170 (79) and excludes the structure type requirement.77 The five main dry bulk 
cargoes are iron ore, coal, grain, bauxite and alumina and phosphate rock.78 This 
dissertation is only concerned with bulk carriers used for the purpose of transporting coal. 
Bulk carriers can be categorized according to the following sizes, however, the below 
sizes may vary slightly and there are further sub-classes: 
i. Mini Bulk carriers used for short distance voyages and coastal trade and 
ranging from 3000 to 10 000 DWT; 
                                                                                                                                  
training activities are conducted on board; (10) degree of shore side support provided to the ship by the 
company; (11) applicable work hour limits and/or rest requirements; and (12) the provisions of the 
approved Ship’s Security Plan. 
74 N. Winchester  … et al ‘An analysis of crewing levels: findings from the SIRC Global Labour Market 
Survey’ (2006) Cardiff University at 12 available at https://orca-
mwe.cf.ac.uk/64731/1/Analysis%20of%20crewing%20levels.pdf, accessed on 14 May 2017. 
75 IMO Maritime Knowledge Centre ‘International shipping facts and figures – information resources on 
trade, safety, security, environment’  (2012) available at 
http://www.imo.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/ShipsAndShippingFactsAndFigures/TheRoleandImportanceofInt
ernationalShipping/Documents/International%20Shipping%20-%20Facts%20and%20Figures.pdf, accessed 
on 2 September 2017. 
76 SOLAS Regulation 1.6/IX. 
77 SOLAS Regulation 1.1/XII. 
78 UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 2016 op cit note 15 at 15. 
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ii. Handies, consisting of Handysize and Handymax carriers, ranging from 10 
000 to 55 000 DWT; 
iii. Panamax carriers ranging from 55 000 to 80 000 DWT;  
iv. Capesize carriers ranging from 80 000 to 200 000 DWT;  
v. Large Capesize carrier ranging from 200 000 to 300 000 DWT; and 
vi. Very Large Bulk Carrier (VLBC) ranging from 300 000 DWT upwards.79 
Bulk carriers sail at an average speed of 13 to 15 knots80 depending on the same factors 
as mentioned above under oil tankers. Similarly, the size of the crew will depend on 
various factors81 and can range from 8 to 30 crewmembers.82 
3.3 Gas carriers 
Gas carriers are used to transport various gases such as LNG, LPG, liquefied 
ethylene gas (LEG), Ammonia (NH3), Chlorine (Cl2) and chemical gases. A gas carrier is 
defined in the International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying 
Liquefied Gases in Bulk (IGC Code) as “a cargo ship constructed or adapted and used for 
the carriage in bulk of any liquefied gas or other products listed in the table of chapter 
19.”83 Gas carrier can be categorised into the following types: 
i. Pressurised LPG carriers; 
                                            
79 MAN Diesel & Turbo Propulsion Trends in Bulk Carriers: Two-stroke Engines (2014) 7 available at 
http://marine.man.eu/docs/librariesprovider6/technical-papers/propulsion-trends-in-bulk-
carriers.pdf?sfvrsn=16, accessed on 14 May 2017. 
80 Shippipedia Bulker available at http://www.shippipedia.com/ships/ship-types/bulker/, accessed on 14 
May 2017. 
81 IMO Resolution A.1047 (27) considerations op cit note 43. 
82 Maritime Connector Categories available at http://maritime-connector.com/bulk-carrier/, accessed on 14 
May 2017. 
83 Maritime Safety Committee Amendments to the International Code for the Construction and Equipment 
of Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk (IGC Code) Resolution MSC.370 (93). 
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ii. Semi-pressurised LPG carriers; 
iii. Ethylene carriers; 
iv. Fully refrigerated LPG carriers; and 
v. LNG carriers.84 
The two main gas carriers are LNG carriers and LPG carriers and are among the most 
sophisticated and specialised vessels due to the fact that gas is not carried in its vapour 
form but in liquid form.85 LPG gases require pressurisation or refrigeration, and in some 
cases a combination of the two, to be maintained in liquid form and LPG carriers are 
generally classified as follows: 
i. Fully pressurised with a cargo capacity of up to 2000 m3; 
ii. Semi-pressurised and semi-refrigerated with a cargo capacity of up to 5000 
m3; 
iii. Semi-pressurised and fully refrigerated with a cargo capacity of up to 15 000 
m3; 
iv. Fully refrigerated with a cargo capacity of 15 000m3 – 85 000m3, the three 
common sizes being 30 000m3, 52 000m3 and 80 000m3.86 
LNG gases are refrigerated at boiling temperature to maintain liquid form and are not 
pressurised much. LNG carriers are fully refrigerated and range from about 1000 m3 
                                            
84 UK P&I Club The Carriage of Liquefied Gases at 1 available at 
https://www.ukpandi.com/fileadmin/uploads/uk-
pi/LP%20Documents/Carefully_to_Carry/Carriage%20of%20liquefied%20gases.pdf, accessed on 8 
September 2017. 
85 Seamanship International Discussion Paper Types of – Liquefied Gas Carriers (2007) available at 
http://img1.eworldship.com/2012/0919/20120919044518692.pdf, accessed on 14 May 2017. 
86 Ibid. 
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to 267 000 m3.87 Gas carriers can travel at speeds of up to 21 knots but usually travel 
at an average speed of 12 knots.88 The number of crew required by a gas carrier, 
likewise to above, will depend on various factors and the number of crew on board 
can range from 14 to 20 crew members.89 Gas carriers are advanced with many 
automated and electronic mechanics and feature, and as a result require even less 
crew.  
4. CHOKE POINTS 
 Fossil fuels occur naturally in certain areas across the globe and according to the 
EIA, approximately 100 countries manufacture crude oil.90 Figure 2 below reflects world 
oil production and consumption, oil refinery capacities and throughput and world natural 
gas production and consumption. It can be seen that the highest consumers do not 
produce enough oil and that producers do not have sufficient refinery capacities and 
throughput and therefore oil and gas have to be transported across the entire globe. As 
stated by Rodrigue, “[t]he geography of the production and consumption is characterized 
by a strong spatial differentiation of supply and demand. Because of geographical and 
geological factors, oil is mainly produced far from where is consumed…”91 To cut 
                                            
87 The International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers LNG Information Paper No. 3 LNG Ships 
(2009) 1 available at 
http://www.giignl.org/sites/default/files/PUBLIC_AREA/About_LNG/4_LNG_Basics/lng_3_-
_lng_ships_7.3.09-aacomments-aug09.pdf, accessed on 2 September 2017. 
88 Ibid.  
89 M Corkhill ‘Tackling the human element in the LNG ship-shore interface’ LNG World Shipping 31 May 
2016 available at http://www.lngworldshipping.com/news/view,tackling-the-human-element-in-the-lng-
shipshore-interface_43133.htm, accessed on 8 September 2017. 
90 U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Country Analysis Brief Where Oil Comes From (2017) 
available at https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=oil_where#tab1, accessed on 19 May 
2017. 
91 J. Rodrigue ‘Straits, passages and chokepoints a maritime geostrategy of petroleum distribution’ (2004) 
Les Cahiers de Geographie du Quebec 357 – 374 at 360. 
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distance and save time oil is transported by tankers via specific routes and sea-lanes.92 
These routes lead ships through strategic passages known as straits or chokepoints. 
Chokepoints are defined as: “narrow channels along widely-used global sea routes, some 
so narrow that restrictions are placed on the size of the vessel that can navigate through 
them.”93 The European Commission defined chokepoints as: 
“… Narrow channels used for transit of large volumes of international sea trade including 
oil. The concerns related to chokepoints can be different: geopolitical in the case of 
transit through potentially unstable areas, environmental and in particular in relation to 
damage from an accident, economic if transit through a chokepoint requires long waiting 
times, security in connection to possible terrorist attack etc.  
Chokepoints therefore represent critical bottlenecks in the energy transport network since 
they transit high volumes of crude and products and the impact of interruptions of transit 
through them would affect severely the global oil market.”94 
There are seven major choke points around the globe, some of which pose a danger to 
energy carrying vessels. These seven major chokepoints and other high-risk zones around 
the globe will be discussed briefly below.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
92 Y Guzansky … et al ‘Power, pirates and petroleum: maritime choke points in the Middle East’ (2011) 
14(4) Strategic Assessment 85 – 98 at 85. 
93 U.S. EIA Country Analysis Brief World Oil Transit Chokepoints (July 2017) available at 
http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.cfm?RegionTopicID=WOTC, accessed on 14 January 
2017. 
94 European Commission, Network Oil Infrastructures – An assessment of the existing and planned oil 
Infrastructures within and towards the EU, Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the 
Green Paper “Towards a secure, sustainable and competitive European energy” (COM (2008) 737), 
SEC (2008) 2869, Brussels, 13 November 2008. 
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4.1 The Straits of Hormuz 
According to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
annual report, the Persian Gulf region holds 50% of the world’s oil reserves.95 The only 
route available by sea from this region96 to the rest of the world is through the Straits of 
                                            
95 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Annual Statistical Bulletin (2015) 22 available at 
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/ASB2015.pdf, accessed 
on 14 January 2017. 
96 There are alternate pipelines available to move oil from this region. For a detailed list of those alternate 
pipelines, see U.S. EIA Country Analysis Brief The Strait of Hormuz is the World’s Most Important Oil 
Figure 2: Major producers and consumers of oil and 
natural gas, 2015 (Source: UNCTAD) 
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Hormuz, which is situated between Iran and Oman and connects the Arabian Gulf to the 
Oman Gulf and the Arabian Sea.97 Approximately 17 million barrels pass through this 
strait daily equating to about 90% of the oil produced in the Persian Gulf.98 Also, a large 
quantity of natural gas passes through this strait, mainly from Qatar to the rest of the 
world. Due to the high volumes of oil and gas that pass through this strait, it has been 
labelled “the most important chokepoint” in the oil trade by the EIA.99 The Strait of 
Hormuz spans 33.8 kilometres at its narrowest point,100 however, both shipping lanes, to 
and from, only span 3.2 kilometres each. The main concern with regards to this strait is 
not piracy but closure due to tensions between Iran and Western Countries. Piracy in this 
strait is uncommon and only four attempted attacks have been reported in this region 
since 2000, two in the Straits of Hormuz and two in the Gulf of Oman. One of the four 
attacks was on a product tanker, the Zhong Chi.101  
During 2009 - 2010 piracy off the coast of Somalia reached its peak and Somali 
pirates would venture further away from the Somali coastline, north towards the Straits of 
Hormuz. Pirates were reported travelling up to 26°N miles, which is just south of this 
strait.102 The ICC IMB annual report warned against attacks near to the Strait of Hormuz, 
reporting that mother ships and skiffs spotted “in the Gulf of Oman, Southern Red Sea 
and the Somali basin, with a number of attacks close to the Straits of Hormuz and the 
                                                                                                                                  
Transit Chokepoint (2012) available at http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=4430, accessed on 
14 January 2017. 
97 Ibid. 
98 C Talmadge ‘Closing time: assessing the Iranian threat to the Strait of Hormuz’ (2008) 33(1) 
International Security 82 – 117 at 82. 
99 U.S. EIA Country Analysis Brief World Oil Transit Chokepoints op cit note 63. 
100 U.S. EIA Country Analysis Brief The Strait of Hormuz is the World’s Most Important Oil Transit 
Chokepoint op cit note 66. 
101 See generally ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the period 1 January – 31 
December 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2012. 
102 Ibid 2012 at 22. 
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energy routes out of the Arabian Gulf.”103 Increased security off the coast of Somalia has 
prevented pirates from wandering north and there have been no reported incidents in the 
Straits of Hormuz or its close surroundings since 2012. Although there have been no 
reported incidents for the past five years, a single incident could cause a collision and 
shut this strait down.  A closure of this strait could cause the price of oil to drastically 
increase, which could increase by up to 50% within a few days.104 Sea is the most cost-
effective means of transport. Oil would have to be transported by pipeline alone and 
transportation costs would thus increase drastically. As stated by Sadad Ibrahim Al-
Husseini, the former head of exploration and development at Saudi Aramco, “to close the 
Strait of Hormuz would be an act of war against the whole world…”105 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
103 Ibid at 24.  
104 “Oil price would skyrocket if Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz” The New York Times available at 
https://mobile.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/business/oil-price-would-skyrocket-if-iran-closed-the-
strait.html?referer=https://www.google.co.za/, accessed on 14 January 2017. 
105 Ibid. 
Figure 3: The Strait of Hormuz (Source: Openseamap) 
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4.2 The Strait of Malacca 
The Strait of Malacca links the Indian Ocean to the South Chinese Sea and Pacific 
Ocean.106 It is situated between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia and is only 2.7 
kilometres wide at its narrowest point. This strait is the main passage leading from the 
Middle East to Asia and approximately 15.2 million barrels of oil pass through this strait 
daily.  The Strait of Malacca is labelled as a “piracy and armed robbery prone area” by 
the ICC-IMB, however, it was noted that incidents in this region had decreased as a result 
of intensified patrols and security.107  In 2015 there were five reported attacks in the strait, 
four of which involved product tankers.+108 In 2016 and in the first half of 2017 there were 
no reported incidents in the strait.109 However, as stated by ReCAAP “there is no room 
for complacency.”110 The surrounding waters remain a major concern and ships entering 
and exiting the Malacca strait have to travel through these waters, which according to the 
ICC-IMB reports, has the highest number of reported incidents. In 2016 a total of 49 
attacks occurred in the waters of Indonesia, 7 attacks occurred in the waters of Malaysia, 
10 attacks occurred in the waters of the Philippines and 2 attacks occurred in the 
Singapore straits. 25% of those attacks were on energy carrying vessels.111 In the first half 
of 2017 there were a total of 36 attacks in the above-mentioned areas of which 41.6% 
were on energy carrying vessels.112 
                                            
106 U.S. EIA Country Analysis Brief Maritime Chokepoints Critical to Petroleum Markets (March 2011) 
available at http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=330, accessed on 8 September 2017. 
107 ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report 2015 op cit note 2 at 18. 
108 Ibid at 31. 
109 ICC IMB Report 1 January – 31 December 2016 op cit note 24 and ICC IMB Piracy and Armed 
Robbery Against Ships Report for the period 1 January – 31 June 2017. 
110 The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia 
(ReCAAP) Monthly Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia Report for April 2017 at 1. 
111 ICC IMB Report 1 January – 31 December 2016 op cit note 24 at 31 – 39 and 55. 
112 ICC IMB Report 1 January 2017 – 30 June 2017 op cit note 79 at 29 – 34 and 40 – 41. 
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The common modus operandi used by pirates in this region is similar to that of 
the MT Lapin discussed above.  Pirates board their target in the cover of night, restrain 
the crew and siphon the fuel cargo from the hijacked vessel to another pirate ship, which 
is brought along side. The pirates destroy communication and navigation equipment 
before escaping.113 The ReCAAP Special Report on Incidents of Siphoning of Fuel/Oil at 
Sea in Asia stated: 
“Illegal siphoning of fuel/oil has become a lucrative business owing to the market price 
and taxes imposed on fuel/oil. With continued demand for fuel/oil in underground 
markets, siphoning incidents are here to stay.”114 
Other incidents in this region involve theft of the ships and crew’s properties. The high 
number of incidents affecting energy carrying vessels provides evidence that they make 
easier targets and are vulnerable to attack. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
113 ReCAAP Annual Report 2015 at 20. 
114 ReCAAP Special Report on Incidents of Siphoning of Fuel/Oil at Sea in Asia (Part II) 2015 at 1. 
Figure 4: The Malacca Strait (Source: Openseamap) 
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4.3 The Strait of Bab el-Mandeb 
Situated between Djibouti and Yemen at the Horn of Africa, the Strait of Bab el-
Mandeb links the Mediterranean Sea, through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, to the 
Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.115 This is an important passage between the Persian 
Gulf and the Suez Canal and sees approximately 3.8 million barrels of oil transported 
through it every day.116 The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are 
within close reach of Somalia pirates and are listed as high-risk zones by the ICC-IMB.117 
These waters made headlines for the unprecedented number of attacks that occurred from 
2008 to 2011.118 As a result, security was increased in this area and after 2012 there was a 
drastic decline in the number of reported incidents in this region. There were no reported 
incidents during 2015119 and in 2016 there were only three attempted attacks, one off the 
coast of Somalia, one by off the coast of Yemen and one in the Gulf of Aden, two of 
which were on energy carrying vessels.120  
On the 15th December 2016 the NATO Operation Shield, one of the anti-piracy 
projects situated off the coastline of Somalia, was terminated. Spokesperson Oana 
Lungescu stated: 
                                            
115 U.S. EIA Country Analysis Brief World Oil Transit Chokepoints op cit note 63. 
116 G Lubin ‘The 7 biggest oil chokepoints in the world – seen like never before’ Business Insider 3 
November 2016 available at http://www.businessinsider.com/biggest-oil-chokepoints-2016-11, accessed on 
8 September 2017. 
117 ICC IMB Report 1 January – 31 December 2016 op cit note 24 at 18. 
118 ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the period 1 January – 31 December 
2011 at 57 & 60. 
119 ICC IMB Report 1 January – 31 December 2015 op cit note 2 at 5. 
120 ICC-IMB Report 1 January – 31 December 2016 op cit note 24 at 7. 
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“Operation Ocean Shield has been a great success – making an essential contribution to 
combating piracy in the seas off Somalia and therefore keeping one of the world’s most 
important waterways safe and secure.”121 
Only three months after its terminations, the first attack occurred in that region since 
2012 on the MT Aris 13, a bunkering tanker.122 Since then there has been 6 other reported 
incidents, three off the coast of Somalia, one off the coast of Yemen, one in the Gulf of 
Aden and one in the Red Sea.123 The increase of incidents since the terminations of 
NATO’s Operation Shield shows that Somali pirates are still present in that region and 
they were only deterred by the strong security presence. Once that presence is gone or 
decreased, piracy in this region may multiply once again. The modus operandi of Somali 
pirates does not involve stealing fuel cargo, however, energy carrying vessels may be 
preferred as they are valuable and vulnerable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
121 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Newsroom NATO Concludes Successful Counter Piracy 
Mission (2016) available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_139420.htm, accessed on 9 September 
2017. 
122 ICC-IMB Report 1 January 2017 – 30 June 2017 op cit note 79 at 37 – 38. 
123 Ibid at 6. 
Figure 5: The Strait of Bab el-Mandeb (Source: OpenseaMap) 
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4.4 The Suez Canal 
The Suez Canal runs through Egypt and is situated on the North West side of the 
Red Sea opposite to the strait of Bab el-Mandeb, which is South East of the Red Sea.  
This strait joins the Mediterranean Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. This is 
a major rout from the Persian Gulf, which leads through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the 
Suez Canal to America and Europe. In 2015 the canal was extended from 60km to 95km 
to allow an expected 97 ships to pass through the canal each day.124 An alternate route to 
the Suez Canal is around the Cape of Good Hope and is somewhat 4345.2 kilometres 
longer.125 In 2013 approximately 3.2 million barrels of oil were transited through the Suez 
Canal each day, equating to about 20% of all cargoes passing through the canal and about 
5.7% of the world’s oil.126+ From 2000 to 2017 there have only been seven reported 
incidents in the Suez Canal and only two were on energy carrying vessels.127 Although 
the number of incidents is low in this strait, it only takes one incident to result in a 
collision.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
124 UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 2016 op cit note 15 at 20. 
125 U.S. EIA Country Analysis Brief World Oil Transit Chokepoints op cit note 63. 
126 Ibid.  
127 See generally ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the period 1 January – 31 
December 2000 – 2017. 
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4.5 The Panama Canal 
The Panama Canal runs through the Isthmus of Panama, a country situated in 
Central America. It joins the Pacific Ocean to the Caribbean Sea and Atlantic Ocean.128 
The Panama Canal is a man-made structure designed to avoid the lengthy trip around the 
Southern tip of South America and was originally only 33.5 metres wide. The largest ship 
that could fit through this canal was a Panamax-size vessel.129 Due to the size limitation, 
approximately only 0.8 million barrels pass through the Panama Canal every day and 
according to the EIA this route is not significant in global oil and petroleum shipping due 
to the fact that most tankers are too large to fit through this canal.130 Panama undertook an 
expansion project of the canal to enable larger ships to pass through it. The canal 
reopened on the 26th June 2016 and is now able to accommodate 90% of the world’s gas 
                                            
128 U.S. EIA Country Analysis Brief World Oil Transit Chokepoints op cit note 63. 
129 Vessel sizes are set out in paragraph 2.3.1 above. 
130 U.S. EIA Country Analysis Brief World Oil Transit Chokepoints op cit note 63. 
Figure 6: The Suez Canal (Source: Openseamaps) 
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carriers,131 however, the expansions are unlikely to radically affect the flow of oil and 
petroleum.132 In 2003 there were only four reported attacks in the Caribbean Ocean, 
which ships wishing to pass through the Panama Canal would have to traverse. There 
have been no reported incidents since then and it appears that energy vessels are not 
targeted in this region. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.6 The Danish Straits 
The Danish Straits are situated between Sweden, Denmark and Germany and join 
the Baltic Sea to the North Sea.133 This route is important for oil being transported from 
Russia to European countries and approximately 3.3 million barrels pass through this 
                                            
131 U.S. EIA Country Analysis Brief Expanded Panama Canal Reduces Travel Time for Shipments of U.S 
LNG to Asian Markets (30 June 2016) available at 
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132 U.S. EIA Country Analysis Brief Panama Canal Expansion Unlikely to Significantly Change Crude Oil, 
Petroleum Product Flow (23 June 2016) available at 
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133 U.S. EIA Country Analysis Brief World Oil Transit Chokepoints op cit note 63. 
Figure 7: The Panama Canal (Source: Openseamaps) 
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strait every day.134 Piracy has not threatened energy carrying vessels in this region and a 
study of the ICC-IMB reports from 2000 to 2017 reveals that there are no reported 
incidents of piracy in the Danish Straits.135 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.7 The Turkish Straits 
The Turkish Straits consists of the Istanbul Strait (The Bosporus), The Canakkale 
Strait (The Dardanelles) and the Sea of Marmara136 and connects the Black Sea with the 
Mediterranean Sea. The Turkish Straits are situated in Turkey’s territorial waters between 
Asia and Europe, however, although the straits are within Turkeys territorial waters, the 
Montreux Convention 1936 allows for free passage through the straits. This is a key route 
                                            
134 U.S. EIA Country Analysis Brief World Oil Transit Chokepoints Critical to Global Energy Security (1 
December 2014) available at https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=18991, accessed on 14 
January 2017. 
135 ICC IMB Reports for 2000 – 2017 op cit note 97. 
136 Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) Briefing paper for OCIMF Member companies 
Guidelines for Transiting the Turkish Straits (2007) available at 
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Figure 8: The Danish Straits (Source: OpenseaMap) 
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for oil moved by sea from Russia and other Eurasian countries with Approximately 2.9 
million barrels of oil being transported through the straits each day. The layout and 
geography of these Straits has caused them to be labelled “among the world’s most 
difficult waterways to navigate because of their sinuous geography.”137 The Turkish 
Straits are reasonably safe from piracy and the main concern with regards to these straits 
pertains to terrorism and collision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.8 Other high-risk zones  
From the above overview, it is apparent that piracy is not as prevalent in 
chokepoints as it was in the past. This is due to the high concentration of navy forces in 
those areas as well as other security tactics. Pirates have therefore moved away from 
these areas to waters with fewer armed forces. A study of the ICC-IMB 2016 annual 
report reveals two areas of major concern, the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) and the coastal 
                                            
137 U.S. EIA Country Analysis Brief World Oil Transit Chokepoints op cit note 63. 
Figure 9: The Turkish Straits (Source: OpenseaMap) 
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waters of India. The GoG extends over approximately 6000 kilometres and consists of 
several different states, which includes the coastlines of Senegal, Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the 
island state of Sao Tome and Principe, Central African Republic, The Republic of the 
Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Angola. In the GoG there were a total of 
53 reported incidents. A total of 51% involved energy carrying vessels.138 Nigeria has a 
total of 36 reported incidents alone and is highest worldwide.+139 A total of 61% of those 
incidents were on energy carrying vessels.140 In the first half of 2017 there were a total of 
16 reported incidents in the GoG of which 37.5% involved energy carrying vessels.141 
The three models of piracy in this region are theft of oil cargo, kidnapping for ransom 
and common theft of onboard property. Theft of oil cargo has decreased in the past three 
years and in 2016 there was only one reported incident that involved the theft of the fuel 
cargo.142 Yet, energy carrying vessels remain the most targeted vessel type. The second 
area of concern is the water off the coast of India, which had a total of 14 incidents of 
which 57% were on energy carrying vessels. In this region there were no reported 
incidents that involved the theft of fuel cargo.143 A study of the 2016 ICC-IMB report 
reveals that the predominant modus operandi of pirates in the above two regions to board 
tankers and steal the ships stores and other valuables. This supports the contention that 
these vessels are not only targeted for their cargo but also because they are vulnerable 
                                            
138 ICC-IMB Report 1 January – 31 December 2016 op cit note 24 at 47 – 54 and 57 – 60. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid. 
141 ICC-IMB Report 1 January 2017 – 30 June 2017 op cit note 79 at 38 – 41 and 43 – 44. 
142 Four armed pirates boarded the MV Harley, a product tanker, and took the duty pump man hostage. They 
submerged two hoses into the forward tank dome and stole the fuel cargo. See ibid at 52. 
143 Supra at 42 – 44. 
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and make easier targets. Their structure, size, speed, the number of crew and the routes 
travelled all contribute to their vulnerability and will be discussed below. 
5. SHIP VULNERABILITIES 
The energy transportation system has been labelled the “Achilles heel” of the oil 
trade due to the fact that these giants have several vulnerabilities and are mostly 
unprotected when at sea.144 Security is both internal and external. Internal security refers 
to security measures implemented by ship owners whereas external security refers to 
navies and patrols. Providing sufficient external security at sea is an almost impossible 
task. The oceans cover a great deal of surface area, approximately 70% of the earth145, 
and apart from insufficient means, it would be impractical to have every inch of the ocean 
protected. Security is located strategically in high-risk zones; however, security is 
“stretched too thin in some cases “to meet its own self-imposed security standards such as 
escorting ships carrying liquefied natural gas””.146 Therefore, security, to the most part, is 
left in the hands of the ship owner who must act in accordance with rules and regulations 
in place to ensure the safety of the vessel. The rules and regulations that apply to energy 
carrying vessels are the same for all vessel types and therefore it fails to take into 
consideration their vulnerabilities. From the above information it is evident that the route 
travelled, the cargo carried and the structure of energy carrying vessels makes them 
vulnerable. The vulnerabilities of energy carrying vessels and will be discussed below. 
                                            
144 Institute for the Analysis of Global Security Threats to Oil Transport available at 
http://www.iags.org/oiltransport.html, accessed on 31 October 2016. 
145 M Williams ‘What percent of earth is water?’ Universe Today 1 December 2014 available at 
https://www.universetoday.com/65588/what-percent-of-earth-is-water/, accessed on 31 October 2016. 
146 H Josef Hebert ‘Oil, LNG tankers vulnerable’ USA Today 1 September 2008 available at 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-01-09-4173632017_x.htm, accessed on 31 October 
2016. 
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Firstly, energy carrying vessels are often very large and slow moving and as set 
out above, these vessels generally travel at an average speed of about 12 knots when fully 
laden. Pirate skiffs on the other hand often travel at speeds over 30 knots and are able to 
catch up to their targets with relative ease.147 Their size and speed also prevent them from 
being able to outmanoeuvre any attackers in small skiffs or speedboats, which are agile 
and easily manoeuvrable.+148 Secondly, the size of these vessels does not act as a deterrent 
to attackers as pirates have developed skills for boarding large vessels while moving. Due 
to the fact that these vessels are slow moving it makes boarding the vessel easier and 
when fully loaded they are low to the water. Pirates attack VLCC’s with relative ease, for 
example, the MV Sirius Star.149 The spokesperson for the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet stated 
about the attack of the MV Sirius Star that: 
“The hijacking was shocking because it highlighted the vulnerability of even very 
large ships and pointed to widening ambitions and capabilities among ransom-hungry 
pirates who have carried out a surge of attacks this year off Somalia. To attack so 
large a vessel and so far south of Somalia presents a nearly impossible security 
problem for the anti-piracy naval task force.”150 
Thirdly, energy carrying vessels and their cargo are extremely valuable and offer a 
rewarding return. Pirates have a few options available to them; they can use the oil cargo 
for the furtherance of their own operations, they can sell it on the black market or procure 
a high ransom for the release of the very valuable tanker, crew and cargo. This makes 
energy carrying vessels a worthwhile target where the reward outweighs the risk. Lastly, 
energy carrying vessels have few crew on board and pirates can easily board a tanker 
                                            
147 P Bruno ‘Tactics of Modern Sea Pirates’ ThoughtCo. 1 March 2017 available at 
https://www.thoughtco.com/tactics-of-modern-sea-pirates-2293170, accessed on 13 May 2017. 
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150 ‘Sirius Star becomes largest ship ever captured’ History 15 November 2008 available at 
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unnoticed. This also makes overpowering the crew a lot easier. Lastly, energy carrying 
vessels are often forced to transit chokepoints and high-risk areas. Chokepoints limit 
manoeuvrability for big ships and are busy, which allows pirates to blend in. 
6. THE IMPACT AND CONSEQUENCES OF ATTACKS ON ENERGY 
CARRYING VESSELS 
Piracy impacts negatively on various spheres and according to Bento it “impacts 
on global shipping, world trade, and the tourist industry.”151 Due to the vast ramifications 
caused by piracy and its cross-border nature, it was labelled as a “crime against all 
humanity”, also referred to as hostis humani generis. The impact caused by piracy on 
energy carrying vessels is similar to the impact caused by piracy on other vessels, apart 
from the fact that the impact may be amplified due to the nature of energy sources. With 
reference to economic impact, the nature refers to the high value and high demand of 
energy sources, its inherent price volatility as well as the key role energy plays in all 
societies. With reference to the impact on the environment and the safety of crew, the 
nature refers to the physical nature of energy sources. Broadly, piracy impacts three 
spheres, namely: (i) the economy; (ii) the environment; and (iii) safety of life at sea. Each 
will be discussed briefly below. 
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6.1 Impact of piracy on the economy 
The exact economic impact of attacks on energy carrying vessels is almost 
impossible to quantify due to the numerous variables.152 Furthermore, studies by 
organizations153 on economic loss caused by piracy are not limited to pirate attacks on 
energy carrying vessels but focus on piracy as a whole. Studies on economic loss range 
from one billion to twenty-five billion dollars.154 Further, many incidents go unreported 
which consequently affects the accuracy of studies.155 The One Earth Future Foundation 
categorizes the impact on the economy into two sub-categories, namely, direct economic 
cost of piracy and secondary (macroeconomic) costs.156 Direct economic costs include the 
cost of ransom, insurance, re-routing, deterrent security equipment, naval forces, 
prosecution and piracy-deterrence organisations. Secondary costs include costs to 
regional trade, food price inflation, and in this case, oil and fuel price inflation and the 
cost of reduced foreign revenue.  
 
                                            152 Captain P.S. Anabraba states: “The global cost of piracy … remains uncertain, with existing 
assessments providing divergent estimates and conclusions. Existing studies tend to primarily focus on 
calculating first order costs such as the cost of ransoms, security deterrence equipment and naval forces 
deployment. The secondary costs of piracy, such as the effects on foreign investment in the affected and 
neighbouring regions, or on commodity prices appear so far to have benefited from much less attention. 
Existing studies differ in terms of their methodology and approach and, therefore, are neither directly 
comparable, nor provide a definite authoritative assessment of piracy related costs.” See Captain P.S. 
Anabraba ‘Multinational counter-piracy operations’ African Defence 12 July 2016 available at 
http://www.african-defense.com/interesting-post/multinational-counter-piracy-operations/, accessed on 8 
September 2017. 
153 Studies have been done by, among many others, UNCTAD, the International Growth Centre, The One 
Earth Future Foundation, Oceans Beyond Piracy, the Royal Economic Society and academics such as L.M. 
Johnson, B.H. Dubner, R. Raturi and L.R. van der Meijden. 
154 L Bento op cit note 121. 
155 A Bowden ‘The economic costs of maritime piracy’ (2010) One Earth Future Foundation Working 
Paper at 7 – 8. 
156 Ibid at 6. 
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6.1.1 Direct economic costs 
6.1.1.1 Ransom 
Somali pirates often take control of vessels and kidnap crew to procure ransom 
money from Ship owners and charterers for the release of the vessel and crew. Ship 
owners and charterer can pay millions in ransom and the highest recorded ransom to date 
is US$13.5million, which was paid for the release of the Irene SL, a VLCC carrying 
approximately two million barrels of oil.157 The One Earth Future Foundation notes the 
drastic increase in ransoms, which averaged approximately $150 000 in 2005, 
approximately $3.4 million in 2009 and a predicted average of approximately $5.4 
million in 2010.158 It is also noted that the cost of ransom does not include the cost of 
communication and negotiations, the cost of delivering the ransom money, the cost of 
repair of any damage caused by the pirates, the cost of medical help for physical or 
mental trauma and the cost of loss of income due to the vessel being out of operation.159 
6.1.1.2 Insurance 
As a result of increased risk, insurance companies have increased their shipping 
rates and premiums. General insurance covers loss or damage due to certain risks. Risks 
that are not covered by the general insurance will be covered by a sub-category, which 
incurs an additional charge. ‘War risk’ insurance covers ships transiting through war risk 
areas. Certain areas affected by piracy have been categorised as war risk areas, some of 
which include the Gulf of Aden, the Malacca Straits and the waters off the Coast of 
                                            
157 Guinness Book of Records available at http://www.guinnessworldrecords.com/world-records/highest-
hijack-ransom, accessed on 16 June 2017. 
158 Supra at 9. 
159 Ibid at 9 – 10. 
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Nigeria.160 The other main sub-categories are kidnap and ransom insurance, cargo 
insurance and hull insurance. All of which increased drastically with the up rise in piracy 
in previous years.161 Due to increased security and the decrease in piracy in recent years, 
insurance has decreased since 2011.162 
6.1.1.3 Re-routing 
To avoid passing through high risk zones vessels can re-route. However, re-
routing means avoiding strategic chokepoints that make the voyage shorter. Re-routing 
around the Cape of Good Hope, avoiding the Gulf of Aden, the Strait of Hormuz, the Red 
Sea and the Suez Canal, adds approximately 4346 kilometres to the voyage, adding 
between fifteen to twenty days to the voyage.163 Re-routing increases costs and as a result 
increases the price of oil and impacts of the economy. Re-routing costs the shipping 
industry an estimated $2.3 to $3 billion per year.164 
6.1.1.4 Deterrent equipment and security 
Ship owners and charterers may opt to hire private security, install security 
equipment or modify their ships with certain pirate deterrents such as razor wire, electric 
fencing or water sprayers. The One Earth Future Foundation estimates that the shipping 
                                            
160 War Risk Insurance 2016 The Swedish Club 17 December 2015 available at 
http://www.swedishclub.com/media_upload/files/Circulars/408-2015%20Marine-war_2015Dec.pdf, 
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34. 
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industry spends anywhere between $363 million to $2.5 billion on vessel hardening and 
security.165  
6.1.1.5 Naval forces 
Numerous states around the globe have contributed to the fight against piracy by 
providing funds or Naval Forces. The One Earth Future Foundation estimates that 
approximately $228.3 million was spent on naval forces in the Horn of Africa alone in 
2016.166 This is significantly less than the estimated approximate of $2 billion for 2010.167  
6.1.1.6 Prosecution 
Piracy involves many different states such as the state of victims, the state of the 
crew, the state of the accused, the state whose waters the crime may have occurred in, the 
state of the ship owner, the state where the ship is registered, the state of the exporter, the 
state of the importer and the state of the insurance company. Due to the various states 
affected, in terms of UNCLOS any state may arrest and prosecute pirates. This principle 
is known as universal jurisdiction. Article 105 of UNCLOS provides that: 
“On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State 
may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the 
control of pirates and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the 
State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed and may 
also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject 
to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.” [Emphasis added] 
Somalia, for example, lacks a functional government, the necessary resources and the 
infrastructure to prosecute Somali pirates. As a result, it has become the responsibility of 
                                            
165 Ibid at 15. 
166 Ocean Beyond Piracy Org. Report 2016 available at 
http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/reports/sop/summary, accessed on 16 June 2017. 
167 A Bowden op cit note 125 at 16. 
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neighbouring states to take the necessary steps to capture and prosecute pirates. The 
international community provides financial aid to other regional countries to encourage 
participation and assist alleviate undue financial costs on states prosecuting piracy 
crimes.168 The estimated average cost of prosecuting a piracy case is approximately $246 
000 in Europe.169 It is estimated that prosecutions costs were approximately $31.3 million 
in 2010.170  
6.1.1.7 Piracy deterrence organisations 
As a result of piracy, many anti-piracy organisations have been established over 
the years. Some of which include the UN Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of 
Somali, IMO Djibouti Code, ReCAAP and United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC). In 2010 the total budget of the aforementioned organisations amounted to 
approximately $24.5 million and in 2012 it amounted to approximately $24.08 million.+171 
6.1.2 Secondary Costs 
6.1.2.1 Regional trade 
Neighbouring countries to piracy hotspots may be affected by piracy in that 
traders may be unwilling to enter their risky waters to trade and traders that are willing to 
take the risk will usually have to pay increased insurance and implement alternate 
security measures which increases the price for consumers. Several countries have 
reported a decrease in their fishing sector, among other sectors. Oil trades have been 
                                            
168 Ibid at 17. 
169 F Lorenz and L Eshback ‘Transfer of suspected and convicted pirates’ in M.P. Scharf … et al (ed) 
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affected and according to the One Earth Future Foundation oil production in Nigeria has 
decreased by approximately 20% since 2006.172  
6.1.2.2 Inflation 
Inflation refers to the increase of price in products. Pirate attacks disrupt supply 
and demand and can cause a rapid increase in prices. In June of 2011 the price per barrel 
of oil reached a record high of $240 in Somalia due to the increased number of attacks.173  
6.1.2.3 Reduced foreign revenue 
Foreign revenue may decrease as a result of investors withdrawing from regions 
affected by piracy as piracy will negatively affect their investments. Piracy may also 
cause ship owners to avoid certain ports and canals. Certain canals, like the Suez Canal 
and the Panama Canal, charge a fee to transit. Owners re-routing their vessels will avoid 
canals and consequently canal authorities will suffer from a decrease in income. 
According to the One Earth Future Foundation, Egypt may lose approximately $642 
million per year as a result of ships re-routing to avoid piracy high-risk zones.174 The 
Suez Canal has been closed in the past, namely, from July 1956 to April 1957 and from 
June 1967 to June 1975.175 Although the closure was not caused by piracy, it 
demonstrates the possible economic loss that could be caused in the event of a canal 
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being closed due to pirates. During the latter closure, trade fell by approximately 20% 
between countries that ordinarily made use of the Suez Canal.176  
6.2 Impact of piracy on the environment 
Pirate attacks on energy carrying vessels pose a greater risk to the environment 
than attacks on a grain carrier for example or other ships carrying non-toxic or water-
soluble products. Although there have been no incidents where pirates have caused major 
environmental damage, the risk of collision, spillage, grounding and explosion exists and 
the risk is particularly high in cases where pirates board a vessel and later escape leaving 
the bridge unmanned. For example, pirates attacked the Valiant Carrier, a tanker, and 
later escaped leaving the bridge unmanned. The carrier was left drifting with the current 
until the crew were able to free themselves and re-take control of the tanker.177 The 
chances of an accident occurring in such circumstances are significantly high and a 
collision would most likely result in the vessel being ruptured and oil leaking into the 
ocean. Any collision could easily lead to an explosion, as fuels are highly flammable. 
Furthermore, pirates are untrained and working under stressful circumstances. One 
mistake could result in a fire or any other accident as these huge vessels are advanced and 
complex and require highly trained crew. The possible damage caused by the discharge 
of energy sources into the ocean will depend on the energy source. This section will now 
briefly set out the dangers associated with oil (including crude oil and oil by-products), 
coal and natural gases.  
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6.2.1 Oil cargo 
 Oil spills can cause severe damage to the environment as demonstrated by the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989. The Exxon Valdez collided with a reef, causing severe 
damage to the hull and resulting in approximately 11 million gallons of oil leaking into 
the ocean.178 The aftermath of the spill was disastrous and thousands of animals died.179 
Although the Exxon Valdez spill was not caused by piracy, it showcases the extent of 
damage that could be caused to the environment in the event of an energy vessel being 
left unmanned after an attack and colliding with a reef or other ship. The severity of 
damage is due to the fact that oil is mostly water insoluble and toxic. When birds and sea 
mammals come into contact with it, it creates an oil coating over their feathers and fur, 
which hinders their ability to keep warm and often causes death by hypothermia.180 The 
oil coating may also affect birds’ ability to fly resulting in them drowning. Oil toxicity 
can cause death, irritation or internal damage by contact to the skin and eyes, by ingestion 
or by the inhalation of fumes. Finfish and shellfish are not affected as much as sea 
mammals, turtles and birds as they remain under water whereas oil floats. Oil can destroy 
fish and turtle eggs and disrupt reproductive hormones.181 Other animals of pray can also 
be affected if they eat sea life that is contaminated. Once the oil reaches the shoreline it 
coats the sand and rocks and causes harm to sea creatures living in the sand, like crabs, as 
well as other coastal life. Oil spills are not only a danger to sea life but also to humans 
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that come into contact with it either directly by coming into contact with contaminated 
soil or water or indirectly by ingesting contaminated sea life.182 
6.2.2 Coal cargo 
Coal, also referred to as “black gold”, is conveyed across the globe by bulk carriers 
and is a black sedimentary rock that occurs naturally.183 There is a major lacuna in 
research on the effects of unburnt coal on the marine environment.184  An experiment 
conducted in June – July 2015 revealed that coral tissue died from exposure to coal 
sediment and the higher the exposure to coal the more tissue mortality occurred.185 Fish 
exposed to coal had lower growth rates, however, only the fish exposed to the highest 
coal treatment died. Sea grass that was exposed to coal had considerable inhibited growth 
with visible difference in leaf elongation and shoot density. There have been no major 
coal spills caused by piracy but similarly to above, the risk does exist and the potential 
danger to the environment, although not as dangerous as oil, is vast. 
6.2.3 Natural Gases 
Highly advanced gas carriers are used to transport natural gases due to the fact 
that they are volatile, meaning they vaporize easily at normal temperature, resulting in 
them dissipating completely once they exposed to air and warm up.186 Due to the fact that 
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gas dissipates, there is no major threat to the environment apart from contributing to 
global warming. Vapours are, however, flammable and fire and explosion could be a 
threat to crewmembers.  
6.3 The impact of piracy on safety at sea for crewmembers 
Pirates have evolved with the times and often make use of advanced weapons and 
equipment. Being lawless, they are able to avoid regulations and obtain weapons easily 
on the black market. For example van der Merwe stated, “We found that Libyan weapons 
are being sold in what is the world’s biggest black market for illegal gun smugglers, and 
Somali pirates are among those buying from sellers in Sierra Leone, Liberia and other 
countries.”187 According to the 2016 annual IMB report, Somali pirates are usually “well 
armed with automatic weapons and RPG”.188 The ICC IMB categorises the weapons used 
by pirates into the following categories: guns, knives, not stated and other weapons. 
During 2016, 48 attacks involved the use of guns, 44 involved the use of knives, 96 
attacks did not state the weapons used and 3 attacks involved the use of other weapons.189 
During 2016 a total of 5 crew were assaulted, 151 were taken hostage, 8 were 
injured, 62 were kidnapped for ransom and 10 were threatened.190 Although the sum total 
of all of the above is the lowest it has been since 2003, according to the ICC-IMB report, 
the number of kidnappings is the highest it has been in 10 years.191 The ICC-IMB report 
states “a total of 151 crew were taken hostage and 62 kidnapped from their vessels in 15 
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separate incidents – compared to 19 crew kidnapped from five incidents in 2015.”192 
Although pirates do not often kill or injure the crew, to ensure they receive a high 
ransom, nevertheless, crew are often held hostage for long periods of time and endure 
extreme psychological damage from the traumatic events.193 A study on the psychological 
impact on crew caused by piracy found that 57.14% of the subjects suffered from 
detachment, 42.85% were startled by noises, 71.42% suffered from anxiety, 57.14% had 
flashbacks of traumatic events, 28.57% had depressive symptoms and 42.85% suffered 
from sleep disturbances.194  
7. CONCLUSION 
Most of the world’s energy is carried by sea on tankers, gas carriers and bulk 
carriers. The energy sector accounts for a large portion of the maritime trade, nearly 
30%,195 and several countries depend on maritime transport for the import of fossil fuels. 
From the above, it is clear that the transport of energy sources by sea is indispensable. It 
follows that the security on board energy carrying vessels is essential to ensure that the 
cargo, vessel, crew and interests by various states are protected. Yet, despite the increase 
of security at sea and the implementation of various ship hardening mechanisms, energy 
carrying vessels are the most targeted vessels by pirates and nearly half the attacks in 
2016 and in the first quarter of 2017 were on energy carrying vessels.  
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The above overview of the main straits reveals that piracy is no longer ramped in 
those areas. The Malacca Straits however and the surrounding waters remain a high-risk 
zone with nearly half the attacks in the first quarter of 2017 being on energy carrying 
vessels. Other high-risk areas for energy carrying vessels include the GoG and the waters 
off the Indian coastline. Piracy in the Malacca Straits and surrounding waters mainly 
involve theft of oil cargo whereas piracy in the GoG and Indian waters involves theft of 
valuables on board energy carrying vessels. The conclusion is that energy carrying 
vessels are not only targeted for their valuable cargo but also because they make easier 
targets due to their vulnerabilities. As set out above, energy carrying vessels are 
vulnerable to attack for several reasons. They are large, slow moving and have minimum 
crew, pirates are able to board these vessels, overpower the crew and take control with 
relative ease. These vulnerabilities are the very reason energy carrying vessels require 
additional regulations to ensure their safety and energy security. 
Piracy impacts the economy, directly and indirectly, and the safety of crew at sea 
and it poses a potential danger to the environment. Ship owners and charterers bear most 
of the economical impact, which they incur on increased insurance, vessel hardening 
mechanisms, re-routing and ransom. States are burdened with the expense of prosecution, 
detention and the supply of naval forces. As a result of the increased economical strain on 
ship owners, charterers and the State, the overall prices’ relating to energy sources and 
other commodities or services that use energy sources is increased. In turn, this affects 
states, companies and end users as well as the maritime trade in general.  Crew who are 
attacked or taken hostage face physical as well as mental threats to their person and 
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psyche.  These vast negative consequences emphasize the importance and necessity for 
effective security on board energy carrying vessels. 
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CHAPTER 3: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
1. INTRODUCTION 
After the resurgence of piracy in 2006 off the coast of Somalia it became clear 
that the then current framework was wholly insufficient to deal with the epidemic and it 
was necessary to revise it in order to cope with the force and tactics used by modern 
pirates. It was insufficient because most of the acts of piracy fell outside the scope of the 
framework, as it did not meet the criteria. Piratical acts that did not meet the criteria were 
unregulated at an international level and states did not have the necessary jurisdiction to 
take steps to combat them. Today an extensive set of regulations exists in an attempt to 
suppress maritime crimes and although the overall number of reported incidents has 
decreased, 41% of the reported incidents in 2016 involved energy carrying vessels.196 In 
light of the high number of attacks concerning energy carrying vessels and taking into 
account their vulnerabilities, as set out in the previous chapter, the question arises as to 
whether the current framework, both international and regional, is sufficient. This is the 
key question that this chapter and the next chapter will aim to answer. In order to 
establish this the chapter will set out the international legal framework relating to security 
on board energy carrying vessels. A study of the current framework will reveal that there 
are no provisions that apply specifically to the protection of energy carrying vessels from 
piracy. Therefore, energy carrying vessels fall under the same umbrella framework as all 
other vessels, which fails to take into account their inherent vulnerabilities as discussed in 
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the previous chapter. Energy carrying vessels carry valuable cargo through chokepoints 
and other high-risk areas and huge, slow moving and low to the water. These 
vulnerabilities emphasise the necessity for energy carrying vessels to be subject to a more 
specialised framework, which will assist to lessen their vulnerabilities.  
The international framework against piratical acts is contained in three main 
conventions. The first Convention that will be discussed is the UNCLOS, which provides 
a foundation framework on piracy. Each article relating to piracy will be discussed 
below, highlighting the shortcomings and strengths. It was not long after UNCLOS came 
into force that it became apparent that it was insufficient to deal with piracy. The IMO 
embarked on developing the law and what followed was the creation of the SUA 
Convention and the 2005 protocol, which is the second Convention that will be 
discussed. The SUA Convention was primarily developed to combat acts of terrorism, 
however, its articles are broad enough to include acts of piracy and are therefore 
applicable. The third convention that will be discussed is the SOLAS Convention, as 
amended, as well as the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. 
SOLAS, a convention focused primarily on safety, only contains a few provisions 
relating to security. Only the relevant provisions will be discussed below. 
 The international framework provides a useful body of law to be used by state 
parties to each convention to assist in combating maritime piracy. The current framework 
still contains several shortcomings that hinder the successful suppression of piracy. It is 
submitted that one shortcoming is that the framework fails to provide bespoke laws 
applicable to energy carrying vessels. Bespoke laws would assist to decrease their 
vulnerabilities and improve security on board. Energy is such a valuable commodity to 
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society and ships carry 90% of that energy. Nearly half of the reported incidents involve 
energy carrying vessels essentially causing a major threat to energy security. There are no 
provisions within the above-mentioned conventions that relate specifically to security on 
board energy carrying vessels, but it is important to set out the relevant provisions as they 
provide the general legal framework in place and although not specifically applicable to 
energy carrying vessels, the provisions are nonetheless applicable to energy carrying 
vessels that fly the flag of states that are party to the abovementioned conventions.   
2. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE OF LAW OF THE SEA 1982 
(UNCLOS)  
The rapid growth in sea born trade, development in oil exploration, the extension 
by states of their claim to coastal waters, fishing and pollution all gave rise to the 
necessity to create a legal regime that would create “a more stable order, promote greater 
use and better management of ocean resources and generate harmony and goodwill 
among States that would no longer have to eye each other suspiciously over conflicting 
claims”.197 UNCLOS essentially codified the customary international law that existed at 
the time and provides the law of the sea .198 Articles 100 – 107, 110 and 111 deals with 
piracy and the definition thereof, jurisdiction and obligations of states and these articles 
almost replicate Articles 14 to 22 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas of 1958.199 
At the time of creation of UNCLOS, piracy was not viewed as a prevalent concern. In 
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fact, it was believed that piracy was somewhat obsolete and that the nine Articles 
dedicated to piracy were unjustified.200 There are no Articles that apply specifically to 
energy carrying vessels. This is not surprising considering the lack of concern about 
piracy in general, let alone in relation to a specific vessel type. Further, it has only 
recently become evident that oil tankers are targeted for their cargo.201 The relevant 
articles of UNCLOS will be discussed below. 
Article 100 assigns a duty to all states to cooperate to the fullest possible extent in 
the repression of piracy.202 This is a general duty and UNCLOS does not set out what 
exactly the term ‘cooperation’ entails and methods of cooperation to be used. At the 
centre of cooperation is information sharing and coordination between various actors 
however UNCLOS fails to include any provisions on those aspects. Article 101 sets out 
the definition of piracy and includes any act of inciting or intentionally facilitating any 
acts if piracy203 and acts of piracy committed by warships, government ships and 
government aircrafts whose crew have mutinied and taken control of the ship or 
aircraft.204 Article 101 contains four essential elements that must be present for an act to 
constitute an act of piracy. The four elements are:  
i. Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation; 
                                            
200 V Surbun ‘The developing jurisprudence to combat modern maritime piracy: a crime of the high seas?’ 
(2010) 43(1) The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 1 – 22 at 14. 
201 D Nincic ‘Maritime Piracy: Implications for maritime energy security’ (2009) Journal of Energy 
Security available at 
http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=180:maritime-piracy-
implications-for-maritime-energy-security&catid=9, accessed on 11 November 2017. Also see S Oakford 
‘Pirates are running wild and hijacking oil tankers in southeast Asia’ (2015) Vice News available at 
https://news.vice.com/article/pirates-are-running-wild-and-hijacking-oil-tankers-in-southeast-asia, accessed 
on 11 November 2017. 
202 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 100. Full text available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.  
203 Ibid Article 101(c). 
204 Ibid Article 102. 
 60 
ii. Committed for private ends; 
iii. On the high seas; 
iv. Against another ship i.e. involving at least two ships.  
These essential elements contained within the definition in Article 101 caused the 
definition of piracy and therefore the application of UNCLOS to be narrow. The 
definition of piracy came under scrutiny in 1985 when a political group seized the MS 
Achille Lauro.205 The attack on the MS Achille Lauro did not fall within the ambit of 
Article 101 for two reasons, namely, the attack was not committed for private ends and 
there was no second ship involved and as such the crime did not constitute an act of 
piracy and could not be tried in terms of UNCLOS.206 The third element caused the most 
problem as it excluded crimes committed in the territorial waters of a state when in fact 
the majority of pirate-like crimes in recent times are committed within the territorial 
waters of states.207 Piratical acts committed within a state’s territorial waters fall solely 
within the jurisdiction of that state. The problem being that that state may not have 
sufficient domestic legislation or the necessary resources to exercise jurisdiction, 
resulting in many pirates escaping punishment. 
Article 105 empowers any state to seize a pirate ship or aircraft, arrest any 
persons suspected of piracy and seize any property on board on the high seas or in any 
other place outside the jurisdiction of any state, after which such property and persons 
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become subject to the laws of the arresting state. A pirate ship or aircraft is defined 
subjectively in that the person controlling the ship or aircraft must intend to use the ship 
or aircraft to carry out one of the acts provided in Article 101.208 A pirate ship will retain 
its original nationality as stated by Article 104, any loss or retention of the nationality of 
a pirate ship must be determined in accordance with the law of the state from which the 
nationality is derived.209 The jurisdiction conferred by Article 105 is referred to as 
‘universal jurisdiction’ and confers on states wide powers to arrest any person suspected 
of piracy, seize the pirate ship or aircraft as well as property on board and to determine 
the penalties to be imposed. Arrested pirates will be subject to the domestic laws of the 
state exercising jurisdiction. Prosecution of international crimes in terms of domestic law 
will be discussed below under SUA and applies equally to prosecution under UNLCOS. 
Any state making an arrest must have adequate grounds to believe that the arrested 
persons committed an act of piracy. Any state that makes an arrest or seizes any property 
without adequate grounds can be held liable by the state of the nationality of the persons 
arrested or the property seized.210 The use of the word ‘may’ in Article 105 means that 
states are not obligated to take such steps but are free to elect whether they will arrest and 
prosecute pirates and seize their property. Any arrest or seizure must be affected by 
warships211 or military aircrafts, or other ships or aircrafts clearly marked and identifiable 
as being on government service and authorised to that effect.212 Article 105 does not 
confer jurisdiction on a single state but on ‘every state’, however, it fails to provide 
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guidelines to determine which state must exercise jurisdiction if no state has established 
or wants to establish jurisdiction or which state would have preferent jurisdiction if more 
than one state has established and wants to exercise jurisdiction.213 Article 110 gives 
warships or other duly authorized ships clearly marked and identifiable as being on 
government service the right to board a vessel if, inter alia, there are reasonable grounds 
for suspecting that the ship is engaged in piracy. Lastly, Article 111 entitles contracting 
states to the right of hot pursuit of any vessel that is suspected of violating state laws and 
regulations. Hot pursuit must be commenced in a state’s territorial waters up to the EEZ 
but must be terminated once the vessel reaches the territorial waters of either its own state 
or another state. 
UNLCOS provides a basic framework that establishes jurisdiction over acts of 
piracy as defined in article 101. However, the narrow definition of piracy restricts the 
conventions applicability and as a stand-alone convention is insufficient to combat 
maritime piracy. Energy carrying vessels are often attacked within the territorial waters 
of a state, for example, and as set out in the previous chapter; energy carrying vessels are 
mostly targeted in the Malacca Straits and the GoG. Also, energy carrying vessels are 
more likely to be targeted by terrorists whose acts are not conducted for private-ends and 
therefore fall outside the scope of UNCLOS. Apart from its narrow application, it does 
not sufficiently provide for the prosecution of arrested pirates, procedures for 
investigation, the transfer of pirates to a third party to prosecute or the prevention of 
piracy. Despite several gaps in UNCLOS as aforementioned, it remains an important 
convention that forms the base of the international legal framework. 
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3. CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSIONS ON UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST 
SAFETY OF MARITIME NAVIGATION (SUA) 1988 AND 2005 PROTOCOL 
During the 1980s a number of sea crimes took place, one of which was the 
hijacking of the MS Achille Lauro,214 which caused major concern to the international 
community as those incidents showed that UNCLOS provided an insufficient framework 
to combat maritime crimes. The narrow definition of piracy meant that crimes that did 
not meet the strict criteria, like the MS Achille Lauro incident, could not be tried in terms 
of international law. In 1986 the IMO was tasked to prepare a convention on unlawful 
acts against the safety of maritime navigation “to provide for a comprehensive 
suppression of unlawful acts committed against the safety of maritime navigation which 
endanger innocent human lives, jeopardize the safety of persons and property, seriously 
affect the operation of maritime service and thus are a grave concern to the international 
community as a whole.”215 In 1988 at a conference in Rome, the SUA Convention was 
adopted and opened up for signature. It came into forces in 1992 and currently there are 
166 contracting states.216 The 2005 Protocol was adopted at London on 14 October 2005 
and opened for signature on the 14th February 2006. The 2005 Protocol only entered into 
force nearly five years later on 28 July 2010 and to date there are only 41 contracting 
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states to the 2005 Protocol.217 The SUA Convention and the 2005 Protocol should be read 
in conjunction with the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety 
of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, 1988 (SUA PROT) and 2005 SUA 
PROT Protocol, which was concluded at the same time and extends the provisions of the 
SUA Convention and 2005 Protocol to fixed drilling and production platforms. A major 
concern with SUA is that it is not widely accepted. Some states of importance that are 
located near to piracy prone areas or linked with piracy and/or terrorism that have not 
ratified the SUA Convention nor the 2005 Protocol are Malaysia, Thailand, Somalia and 
Indonesia.218 According to Herbert-Burns the main aim of the SUA Convention and the 
2005 Protocol read with the SUA PROT and 2005 SUA PROT Protocol “is to ensure that 
sufficient and appropriate action is taken against those who have committed unlawful acts 
against vessels and offshore oil and gas infrastructure.”219  
SUA provides an extensive list of offences in Article 3 of the SUA Convention220 
and Articles 3bis, 3ter and 3quater of 2005 Protocol, which are punishable in terms of the 
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Conventions.221 The key element of all of the listed offences is that the crime must be 
committed “unlawfully and intentionally”. A further key element in articles 3(1)(b) to (f) 
is that the act must “endanger the safe navigation of that ship”. SUA does not re-define 
piracy and the offences included in SUA are distinct “from the traditional international 
crime of piracy.”222 SUA attempts to fill the gaps by providing an international 
convention to try crimes that do not fall within the jurisdictional ambit of UNCLOS. 
Some noteworthy innovations are firstly; SUA does not require the crime to be 
committed on the high seas. Secondly, there is no motive requirement, as SUA does not 
differentiate between crimes committed for private-ends and political-ends and thirdly, 
there is no requirement for an offence to be committed by one ship against another ship 
therefore discarding the two-ship requirement.223 With regards to the geographical scope 
of SUA, Article 4 provides that the “convention applies if the ship is navigating or is 
scheduled to navigate into, through or from waters beyond the outer limits of the 
territorial sea of a single state, or the lateral limits of its territorial sea with adjacent 
states.”224 Where the convention does not apply as aforesaid it will nevertheless apply 
when an “offender or the alleged offender is found in the territory of a state party other 
than a state referred to in paragraph 1.”225 SUA does away with universal jurisdiction, 
restricting its application, and introducing a requirement for a nexus between the state 
                                                                                                                                  
or without a condition, as is provided for under national law, aimed at compelling a physical or juridical 
person to do or refrain from doing any act, to commit any 16 of the offences set forth in paragraph 1, 
subparagraphs (b), (c) and (e), if that threat is likely to endanger the safe navigation of the ship in 
question.” 
221 See Article 5, which states “Each State Party shall make the offences set forth in article 3 punishable by 
appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of those offenses.” 
222 M.D.S. Karim op cit note 12 at 53. 
223 L Azubuike op cit note 11 at 53. 
224 The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, March 10 1988, Article 4(1).  Full text available from 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/conventions/Conv8.pdf.  
225 Ibid Article 4(2). 
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and the offender, ship or victim. A positive aspect of this is that it provides clearer 
provisions relating to jurisdiction; setting out circumstances when a state ‘shall’ establish 
jurisdiction or when a state ‘may’ establish jurisdiction. However, there is still no 
provision to assist with establishing who would have preferent jurisdiction if more than 
one state had established jurisdiction and wished to exercise it. Article 6 provides: 
“Each state party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its 
jurisdiction over the offences set forth in article 3 when the offence is committed: against 
or on board a ship flying the flag of the state at the time the offence is committed; or 
(a) in the territory of that state, including its territorial sea; or 
(b) by a national of that state. 
A state part may also establish its jurisdiction over any such offence when: 
(a) it is committed by a stateless person whose habitual residence is in that state; or 
(b) during its commission a national of that state is seized, threatened, injured or 
killed; or 
(c) it is committed in an attempt to compel that state to so or abstain from doing 
any act.” 
Although SUA provides clearer rules relating to jurisdiction, it fails to make provisions 
equivalent to Article 105 and 110 of UNCLOS for apprehending offenders.226 If 
UNCLOS doesn’t apply then this leaves a lacuna in the framework with regards to 
apprehending offenders. In an attempt to rectify this, Article 8bis of the 2005 Protocol 
provides for law enforcement or authorized state officials of a state party to board a ship 
of another state party if there are “reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship or a person 
on board the ship is, has been, or is about to be involved in, the commission of an offence 
set forth in article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater”.227 The state wishing to board the ship of 
another state must confirm the nationality of the ship and obtain consent from the state to 
                                            
226 M.D.S Karim op cit note 12 at 52. 
227 The Protocol of 2005 to The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence Against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation, Article 8bis (5). Full text available at 
http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/SUA_Convention_and_Protocol.pdf.  
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which the ship belongs before boarding the ship.228 This causes difficulty for states 
wishing to apprehend suspects whom they genuinely suspect are involved in illegal acts. 
The flag state of the suspected ship may not be a party to SUA and may refuse 
permission to board the suspected ship. The requirement to obtain permission could also 
cause unnecessary delays which could hinder the very purpose of SUA. 
Another important article is article 7, which makes provisions for taking an 
accused into custody or taking any other necessary actions to ensure the accused is 
present at any criminal or extradition proceedings and which must be done in accordance 
with the laws of the state taking such actions.229 The state that has an accused in custody 
must immediately hold a preliminary enquiry into the facts of the incident and this too 
must be done in accordance with that states laws.230 Once a state has conducted a 
preliminary enquiry it must either prosecute the accused, if it has established jurisdiction 
or it must extradite the accused to a state that has. If a state has established jurisdiction 
but is unwilling to prosecute the offence then it is under an obligation to extradite the 
accused offender.231 Therefore, state parties are obliged to either prosecute offenders or to 
extradite them to a state with jurisdiction willing to prosecute the offenders. This 
principle is referred to as “aut dedere aut judicare”.232 This helps to ensure that accused 
persons are prosecuted rather than released by a state wanting to avoid the administration 
and expense associated with prosecution and detention.233 States are reluctant to expend 
                                            
228 Ibid Article 8bis(5)(a) & (b). 
229 SUA 1988 op cit note 29 Article 7(1). 
230 Ibid Article 7(2). 
231 Ibid article 10. 
232 M.D.S Karim op cit note 12 at 51. 
233 This is not a sure way to ensure prosecution as states may very well elect to release pirates to avoid the 
expense of any compulsory preliminary enquiry and costs of extradition and detention until successful 
extradition takes place. 
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resources to try matters and detain accused or convicted persons as it can cost a country 
millions.234 Further, some states have limited, if any, available resources and jail space to 
try, prosecute and convict. Treves stated: 
“[States] seem concerned by the expense involved, by legal complexities, relating for 
instance to evidence, inherent in criminal proceedings to be held far away from the place 
where the alleged crime was committed, and, perhaps especially, by the human rights 
implications of exercising jurisdiction.”235 
The result of states unwillingness to use state resources, and the lack of state resources, is 
that pirates are often released rather than prosecuted. Allowing an accused to be 
transferred to a state that is willing to prosecute will help prevent accused persons being 
released without being tried. Several states have entered into transfer agreements to aid 
prosecution and detention.  
There is no international court responsible for prosecuting maritime crimes under 
UNCLOS and SUA and it is clear from the above that each state has a responsibility to 
establish jurisdiction in certain circumstances or may elect to establish jurisdiction in 
others in order prosecute crimes in accordance with their domestic legislation. An 
accused is subject to the domestic laws of the state exercising jurisdiction and 
prosecuting the crime. Domestic laws relating to piracy differ from state to state, either 
significantly or insignificantly. The variation in legal systems results in inconsistencies 
and the result is that the outcome of a case and the severity of the sentence will depend on 
the court hearing the matter. This is a major concern, especially in respect of human 
                                            
234 M Sterio ‘Fighting Piracy in Somalia (and elsewhere): Why more is needed’ (2009) 33(2) Fordham 
International Law Journal 372 – 408 at 394. 
235 T Treves op cit note 4 at 408. 
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rights.236 Article 5 provides that “each state party shall make the offences set forth in 
article 3 punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of 
those offences.” The convention does not define what is meant by “appropriate 
penalties”. What is ‘appropriate’ is subjective to each state and will therefore vary. 
Another issue with relying on domestic legislation is that some states lack national 
legislation criminalizing piracy and other maritime crimes or national legislation may not 
allow for the prosecution of pirates or other international criminals unless certain 
conditions are met. For example, the United States (US) is unable to prosecute any pirates 
unless they have in some way threatened the national interest of the US.237 Despite the 
unavoidable inconsistencies and other issues with domestic legislation, many authors and 
policymakers believe that national courts are the appropriate forum to try piracy as 
opposed to an international court which is designed to deal with crimes that cannot be 
prosecuted by national courts.238  
There are no provisions that relate specifically to the protection of oil tankers from 
piracy but SUA does contain some noteworthy provisions. Although SUA is primarily 
focused on maritime terrorism its broad application can include some acts of piracy.239 
Karim is of the view that “a plain reading of the unlawful acts listed in SUA Convention 
clearly reveals that some types of piratical acts may qualify as an offence under the SUA 
                                            
236 Certain human rights conventions will be applicable in certain circumstances. Human rights conventions 
relating to human rights include the Convention against Torture, the Refugee Conventions, the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  
237 M Sterio op cit note 39 at 392. 
238 S Beekarry ‘Assessing current trends and efforts to combat piracy’ (201$ 46(1) Case Western Reserve 
Journal of International Law 161 – 175 at 165. See also M.D.S Karim op cit at note 12 at 41 who states 
“Concurring with the most recent approach of the global community, this article argues that the 
operationalization of national courts is the most viable option for ensuring the effective prosecution of 
pirates.” 
239 M.D.S Karim Ibid at 53. 
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Convention.”240 As stated above, the provisions of SUA are extended to fixed drilling and 
production platforms by the 1988 SUA Protocol241 and according to Herbert-Burns 
“provides the first international treaty and framework for combating and prosecuting 
those criminals and terrorists who have attacked (or intend to attack), or used a tanker or 
fixed oil or gas installation as part of a terrorist operation.”242 Article 3bis states that any 
person commits an offence if that person unlawfully and intentionally: 
(a) when the purpose of the act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to 
compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any 
act:  
(i) uses against or on a ship or discharges from a ship any explosive, radioactive 
material or BCN weapon in a manner that causes or is likely to cause death or 
serious injury or damage; or 
(ii) discharges, from a ship, oil, liquefied natural gas, or other hazardous or noxious 
substance, which is not covered by subparagraph (a)(i), in such quantity or 
concentration that causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury or damage; or  
(iii) […] 
(iv) […] 
Importantly, the above article takes cognisance of the vulnerabilities and possible dangers 
related to energy structures and energy carrying vessels. By specifically making such acts 
a crime it ensures that states have jurisdiction to take the necessary steps, minimising the 
chance of an accused raising jurisdiction as a defence and escaping the justice system. 
The purpose of the act as set out above must be to intimidate a population or compel a 
government or other organisation. This limits the scope of this section, which by 
definition will apply more to acts of terrorism. 
 
                                            
240 Ibid.  
241 SUA 1988 op cit note 29. 
242 R Herbert-Burns op cit note 24 at 142. 
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4. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA 1974 
(SOLAS CONVENTION) 
SOLAS is an international treaty that provides a minimum standard for safety 
with regards to construction, equipment and the operation of ships. This convention was 
the much needed result after the tragic event of the Titanic243, which highlighted the sever 
lack of safety measures that are necessary in all emergency situations. Several versions of 
SOLAS were adopted over the preceding years after Titanic, the last version was adopted 
in 1974 and included a tacit acceptance procedure to allow for the convention to be 
updated and amended as necessary.244 SOLAS entered into force on 25 May 1980 and to 
date there are 163 contracting states.245 The Convention applies to ships entitled to fly the 
flag of contracting states, provided specific requirements are met as set out in SOLAS 
and discussed below.246 Although previously solely focused on safety, various 
amendments have been affected to include provisions to enhance security at sea. These 
amendments should be obvious, considering safety and security are closely interlinked 
and insecurity at sea would automatically threaten safety of persons and property at sea. 
Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS provides “special measures to enhance maritime security” and 
gives effect to the ISPS Code,247 which was adopted in December 2002 after the events of 
9/11 and intended to limit the risk of terrorism at sea. The ISPS Code entered into force 
                                            
243 The Titanic, a British passenger liner, with a total of 2201 persons onboard, collided with an iceberg at 
11.40pm on the 15th of April 1912. The severe lack of safety measures resulted in many deaths and only 
712 people made it off the Titanic alive. See Titanic Inquiry Project available at 
http://www.titanicinquiry.org/, accessed on 11 November 2017. 
244 IMO ‘International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)’ available at 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-
Safety-of-Life-at-Sea-(SOLAS),-1974.aspx, accessed on 11 November 2017. 
245 IMO Status on multilateral conventions op cit note 21 at 16. 
246 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Article II. Full text available at 
http://www.mar.ist.utl.pt/mventura/Projecto-Navios-I/IMO-Conventions%20(copies)/SOLAS.pdf, accessed 
on 11 November 2017. 
247 Ibid Chapter XI-2 Regulation 4(1) and (2). 
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on 1 January 2009.248 Interestingly, chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code provide the first 
provisions of a preventative nature. According to Balkin, “in essence, the new SOLAS 
chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code take the approach that ensuring the security of ships and 
port facilities is basically a risk management activity and that in order to determine what 
security measures are appropriate, an assessment of the risk must be made in each 
particular case.”249 Both chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code state that they apply to: 
“.1 the following types of ships engaged on international voyages:  
.1 passenger ships, including high-speed passenger craft;  
.2 cargo ships, including high-speed craft, of 500 gross tonnage and 
upwards; and  
.3 mobile offshore drilling units; and  
.2 port facilities serving such ships engaged on international voyages.”250  
 
In light of the above provision, Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code will apply to all energy 
carrying vessels that are engaged in international trade. All energy carrying vessels are 
over 500 gross tonnage and due to the geographical location of energy sources, energy 
vessels are predominantly engaged on international voyages. Evidently, they do not apply 
to vessels under 500 gross tonnage and fishing vessels. 
Chapter XI-2 sets out various obligations and responsibilities on contracting 
governments, companies, ships and port facilities. Further, it provides for the 
implementation of the ISPS Code. The ISPS code consists of two parts, namely, part A 
and part B. The former provides mandatory provisions whereas the latter is 
recommendatory.251 ISPS Code provides for ship security plans and is mainly focused on 
                                            
248 IMO Status on multilateral conventions op cit note 21 at 43. 
249 R Balkin ‘The International Maritime Organisation and maritime security’ (2006) 30 Tulane Maritime 
Law Journal 1 – 34 at 17. 
250 SOLAS op cit note 51 Chapter XI-2 Regulation 2. 
251 Ibid Chapter XI-2 Regulation 1(12). 
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the deterrence of terrorist attacks. However, it does not strictly apply to only terrorism. 
The ISPS Code, like Chapter XI-2, sets out responsibilities on contracting governments, 
ship security and port facility security. The ISPS Code is purely preventative in nature 
and its application is limited solely to the ship/port interface.252 According to Balkin the 
ISPS Code “aims to provide a consistent, standardized framework for evaluating risk, 
enabling governments to offset changes in threat levels with changes in vulnerability for 
ships and port facilities through the determination of appropriate security levels and 
corresponding security measures.”253 The key objectives of the code are: 
i. to establish an international framework involving co-operation between 
all participants, both domestic and international; 
ii.  to establish the respective roles and responsibilities of all participants 
iii. to ensure the early and efficient collection and exchange of security-
related information; 
iv. to provide a methodology for security assessment so as to have in place 
plans and procedures changing security levels; and 
v. to ensure confidence that adequate and proportionate maritime security 
measures are in place.254  
The ISPS Code contains three security levels255 to be applied to varying degrees of risk 
and threat. The first security level applies to every day sailing and operations and 
implements a minimum standard of security. The second security level applies to 
situations where there is increased risk, for example when transiting through pirate 
hotspots and requires additional security measures to be implemented until the increased 
risk has decreased. The third security level applies in cases where risk is probable or 
                                            
252 ISPS Code Preamble. Full text available at 
http://www.ubak.gov.tr/BLSM_WIYS/DISGM/tr/HTML/20130304_142647_66968_1_67502.pdf, 
accessed on 11 November 2017. 
253 R Balkin op cit note 54 at 17. 
254 Supra Part A 1.2. 
255 SOLAS defines security level to mean “the qualification of the degree of risk that a security incident will 
be attempted or will occur.” Security incident is defined to mean “any suspicious act or circumstances 
threatening the security of a ship, including a mobile offshore drilling unit and a high speed craft, or of a 
port facility or of any ship/port interface or any ship to ship activity.” 
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imminent and implements specific protective security measures.256 Taking into account 
the heightened risk and vulnerabilities of energy carrying vessels, the ISPS Code could 
provide a security level specifically applicable to energy carrying vessels, to either be 
applied all the time or to be applied when transiting high-risk areas. Although, due to the 
fact that the ISPS Code is primarily focused on the prevention of terrorism and is limited 
to the ship/port interface, its limited application would not be entirely effective as a 
framework for security on board energy carrying vessels. 
Regulation 6 requires ships to have ship security alert systems (SSASs), which 
must be signalled if any threat becomes apparent and transmit a ship-to-shore security 
alert.257 In theory, this is a useful mechanism that is used to signal a competent authority 
or company, notifying them of the ships identity, location and that the ship is under threat 
or that its security has been compromised, allowing for help to be made available. 
However, according to the IMB annual report for 2016, only 15 of the 191 ships attacked 
activated their security alert system. Of the 191 ships attacked, 80 were energy carrying 
vessels and of that 80 only 5 activated their security alert system. The Gray Page258 
provides several reasons for the poor results of the security alerting system: 
i. “the use of low end technology in order to save costs; 
ii. the use of a single source of power and the failure to ensure that the system 
can be operated from an alternative source of power; 
                                            
256 Part A of the ISPS Code defines the three security levels as follows: 
“Security level 1 means the level for which minimum appropriate protective security measures shall be 
maintained at all times.” 
“Security level 2 means the level for which appropriate additional protective security measures shall be 
maintained for a period of time as a result of heightened risk of a security incident.” 
“Security level 3 means the level for which further specific protective security measures shall be 
maintained for a limited period of time when a security incident is probable or imminent, although it may 
not be possible to identify the specific target.” 
257 SOLAS op cit note 51 Chapter XI-2 Regulation 6. 
258 The Gray Page is a specialist maritime consulting group, with wide ranging expertise in investigating 
cargo theft, losses, damage, fraud, hijacking and piracy. See https://www.graypage.com/, accessed on 11 
November 2017. 
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iii. the limited number of activation points; 
iv. the positioning of activation points; 
v. the limited number of crew that know the location of activation points, which 
is usually only the Master and the Ship Security Officer; and 
vi. uncertainty as to when the system should be activated.”259 
Further to the above, a major concern with the security alert systems is the lengthy 
response time to a received alert. According to a review conducted by Timlen, an alert is 
often transmitted from the ship to the owner or other approved authority. The ship owner 
or authority that is notified first, will often verify the alert before notifying the flag state. 
In other instances, discussions are convened to determine the appropriate action that 
needs to be taken before notifying the flag state. Once the flag state of the ship under 
threat or attack has been notified it will notify the coastal states closest to the ship. Only 
then will coastal states be able to respond and offer assistance.260 This process can be 
drawn out, resulting in a failure to provide an expedient response as required in 
circumstances of imminent threat or attack. Interestingly, SASSs is rarely used in 
solidarity and in fact ships are encouraged “to contact the IMB or other agencies such as 
MARLO and the NATO Centre directly for assistance, whilst simultaneously activating 
that SSAS.”261 
SOLAS262 and the ISPS Code fail to recognise the inherent vulnerabilities of 
energy carrying vessels and contain no provisions that apply specifically to security on 
board energy carrying vessels. In fact, SOLAS contain some provisions that may hinder 
                                            
259 Gray Page ‘Ship security alert systems are failing at the time they are needed most’ (14 May 2014) 
available at http://www.graypage.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/2014-05-14-Gray-Page-Ship-security-
alert-systems-failings.pdf, accessed on 11 November 2017. 
260 T Timlen ‘The use of SOLAS ship security alert systems’ (2008) No. 154 S. Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies at 3 available at https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/rsis-pubs/WP154.pdf, 
accessed on 11 November 2017. 
261 Ibid at 8. 
262 SOLAS does contain provisions that relate specifically to energy carrying vessels with regards to safety, 
but not security. 
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the security on board ships and will be set out and explained. Regulation 19263 requires all 
vessels over a certain gross tonnage to be equipped with an automatic identification 
system (AIS).264 The AIS allows the exchange of navigational information between ports 
and other ships and includes information on the ships identity, type, position, course, 
speed, navigational status and other safety related information.265266 The AIS was 
primarily developed to help prevent collision but is now used for various purposes 
relating to safety and as stated by Murphy it was “designed with safety (including 
collision avoidance) rather than security in mind.”267 The AIS raises a few security issues, 
firstly, data can easily be falsified and can be used by for spoofing268 and hijacking269.270 
Secondly, information is within the public domain and can be used by pirates to track 
energy carrying vessels and obtain important information to assist an attack. In an attempt 
to rectify the aforementioned issues, the IMO passed Resolution A.917 (22) authorising 
the master to switch off the AIS in certain circumstances. It states as follows:  
                                            
263 SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19 
264 SOLAS Regulation 19 2.4 provides: “All ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards engaged on 
international voyages and cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards not engaged on international 
voyages and passenger ships irrespective of size shall be fitted with an automatic identification system 
(AIS).” 
265 SOLAS op cit note 52 Regulation 19/2.4. 
266 The AIS is defined as a “system [that] provides for communication, navigation and surveillance 
capabilities for vessels and for fixed coast radio stations. The AIS transponder offers high-speed automated 
communications from ship to ship and ship to shore of vessels, voyages and safety-related information.“ 
See M-2 AIS Transponder System Operational Manual available at https://fccid.io/KLS-M-2/Users-
Manual/Operation-Manual-500384.pdf, accessed on 30 September 2017. 
267 M.N. Murphy ‘The blue, green and brown: Insurgency and counter-insurgency on the water’ in T. 
Benbow and R. Thornton Dimensions of Counter-insurgency: Applying Experience to Practice (2008) at 60 
268 Different forms of spoofing include ship spoofing, AtoN spoofing, SAR spoofing, closest point of 
approach (CPA) spoofing, distress beacon spoofing and faking weather forecasts. See Trend Micro 
(Research Paper) A Security Evaluation of AIS available at 
https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/a-security-evaluation-
of-ais, accessed on 11 November 2017. 
269 AIS hijacking involves altering any information’s about existing AIS stations. Attackers can maliciously 
modify information provided. See Trend Micro ibid. 
270 Ibid. 
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“If the master believes that the continual operation of the AIS might compromise the 
safety or security of his/her ship or where security incidents are imminent, the AIS may 
be switched off.”271 
The effectiveness of AIS was limited by its short range, which was rectified by the 
introduction of the long-range identification and tracking system (LRIT) by regulation 
19-1.272 LRIT is a mandatory requirement that requires the following information to be 
transmitted automatically to authorised governments and authorities: identity of the ship, 
position of ship and date and time of the position provided.273 The LRIT must be capable 
of being switched off or cease the distribution of such information, which the master may 
implement in exceptional circumstances if in his opinion the LRIT compromises the 
safety and security of the ship.274 However, switching off the LRIT may compromise 
safety in relation to navigation and collision and the master will need to make the best 
possible decision taking into account all relevant factor. Another improvement with the 
LRIT is its restricted availability to the public as it uses point-to-point satellite 
communication and not public broadcasting.275 Another hindrance of security is the effect 
that SOLAS has on the employment of privately contracted armed security personnel 
(PCASP). The use of PCASP is a highly controversial topic and the debate on it falls 
outside the scope of this dissertation, save to say that the IMO’s Maritime Safety 
Committee (MSC) has drastically changed its stance with regards to PCASP to “tacitly 
                                            
271 International Maritime Organization (IMO), Resolution A.917 (22), Guidelines for the Onboard 
Operational Use of Shipborne Automatic Identification Systems (AIS), 29 November 2001 as amended by 
Resolution A.956 (23). 
272 SOLAS op cit note 52 Regulation V/19-1, adopted by Resolution MSC.202 (81). 
273 Ibid Regulation V/19-1(5). 
274 Ibid Regulation V/19-1(7). 
275 M Vesper et al… ‘The declining impact of piracy on maritime transport in the Indian Ocean: statistical 
analysis of 5-year vessel tracking date” (2015) 59 Marine Policy 9 -15 at 11. 
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acknowledging that the deployment of armed security personnel on board ships has 
become an accepted industry and flag state practice in certain circumstances.”276 
5. CONCLUSION 
The legal framework as discussed above consists of UNCLOS, the SUA 
Convention and the 2005 Protocol and SOLAS and although there are other conventions 
that may bear some relevance to piracy,277 the aforementioned conventions are the most 
important and bear the most relevance. Although the framework is not specifically 
applicable to energy carrying vessels, it is applicable provided the flag state of the ship is 
a party to the convention and any additional requirements within the specific convention 
are satisfied. The framework provides states with the necessary jurisdiction and 
implements security measure. It allows state parties a wide discretion, often only 
encouraging obligations, as there is no real means of enforcing states to comply. 
Enforcement of the conventions depends on the domestic laws of each state party.  
UNCLOS is a benchmark convention that attempted to codify the international 
customary law that existed at the time of its creation. UNCLOS contains several 
provisions relating to piracy, which at the time was thought to be more than sufficient as 
piracy was almost unheard of. UNCLOS provides an international definition of piracy 
and although the definition is restrictive, it is the most widely accepted definition and 
many succeeding laws have used the definition albeit sometimes extending it. UNCLOS 
                                            
276 Prior to taking this stance MSC.1.Circ.1333, annex, paragraph 5 (June 26, 2009) stated “flag states 
should strongly discourage the carrying and use of firearms by seafarers for personal protection or for the 
protection of a ship”. See IMO on Private Armed Security available at 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Pages/Private-Armed-Security.aspx, 
accessed on 28 October 2017. 
277 Other conventions include the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 1979, the 
United Nations Convention Against Transitional Organized Crime, 2000. 
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provides all states with universal jurisdiction but fails to provide any guidelines on when 
jurisdiction must be established in the event that no states wish to exercise their right of 
universal jurisdiction. It imposes a duty to cooperate in the suppression of piracy and the 
right to visit and the right of hot pursuit. UNCLOS provides provisions for arrest and 
seizures, persons and vessels authorised to conduct such arrests and seizures and liability 
in the event of wrongful arrest and seizure. UNCLOS does not provide guidelines for the 
transfer of suspected pirates and seized property. UNCLOS is an extensive convention, 
covering various different subjects. It does not relate to a specific issue solely or to a 
specific vessel type. UNCLOS would therefore not be suitable to provide for security 
specific to energy carrying vessels. Most subsequent conventions and agreements have 
used UNCLOS as a base or starting point, zoning in on the focal issue of the regime and 
expanding where necessary. 
The SUA Convention aimed, inter alia, to fill the legal gaps that were revealed by 
the event of the Achille Lauro. The 2005 Protocol again made necessary additions to fill 
gaps that had become apparent over the years. SUA does not redefine piracy but includes 
an extensive list of offences, which are broad enough to include certain piratical activity 
and crimes. The provisions of the SUA Convention and the 2005 Protocol are extended 
by the 1988 SUA PROT and 2005 SUA PROT Protocol to fixed drilling and production 
platforms and although not applicable to energy carrying vessels, it recognises the 
vulnerabilities of energy structures at sea. SUA goes a long way to rectify the lacuna left 
by UNCLOS. It is not necessary that the crime be committed on the high seas, there is no 
two-ship requirement and there is no motive required. SUA does require that the act be 
unlawful and intentional and in most cases must endanger the navigation of the ship. 
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SUA requires a nexus between the state exercising jurisdiction and the accused either by 
the victim, accused or the ship and therefore does away with universal jurisdiction. SUA 
provides for taking an accused into custody who then becomes subject to the national 
laws of that state. Any legal proceedings, including extradition proceedings, are 
conducted in accordance with that states domestic law. There are no provisions contained 
in SUA which specifically apply to energy carrying vessels. Considering SUA is 
primarily focused on terrorism, it is somewhat surprising as there have been several 
incidents where terrorists have targeted energy carrying vessels and have made further 
threats to interrupt the supply of energy. Unfortunately, even if SUA did provide 
specifically for energy carrying vessels it would not be entirely effective as very few 
states have adopted the SUA Convention and 2005 Protocol. 
SOLAS provides several security measures that form part of the international 
anti-piracy framework. Chapter XI-2 sets out various obligations on state parties to 
increase security and assist in suppressing piracy and enforces the ISPS Code. Chapter 
XI-2 and the ISPS are preventative in nature and primarily focus on risk management.  
Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code provide for co-operation between states, an outline of 
roles and responsibilities and guideline on information gathering and sharing with the aim 
of enhancing security. In addition, Chapter XI-2 implements the requirement for SASS 
on ships. Although, theoretically an innovative security measure, in practice it has proven 
to be less than successful. SOLAS is yet another convention that fails to provide any 
additional security measures for energy carrying vessels. Certain provisions may even 
increase the risk of attack. Chapter V implements AIS, which can be used by pirates to 
benefit their illegal operation. LRIT provides a more secure tracking system but it did not 
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replace AIS, which is still used. However, both systems may be turned off if the master 
deems it necessary for protection of the vessel and crew.  
The above framework focuses on particular crimes; either piracy or terrorism but 
may encompass both as explained above. UNCLOS and SUA provide states with 
jurisdiction over the crimes included in those conventions. It is up to states to act in 
accordance with the provisions and exercise their jurisdiction accordingly, to bring 
pirates before a court of law to try and punish them for their crimes. SOLAS provides 
some security measures to be implemented by ship owners. The framework is not vessel-
specific and applies when the requirements of that convention are satisfied. It is apparent 
from the previous chapter that energy carrying vessels are more susceptible to attack. 
Energy carrying differ from other vessels because they carry some of the world’s most 
valuable cargo, cargo that is generally volatile and dangerous, they travel very specific 
routes and have inherent vulnerabilities such as their size, speed and minimum crew. The 
high number of attacks on energy carrying vessels shows that these factors need to be 
addressed within a legal context to ensure security on board. The current framework fails 
in this regard and as a result, the international framework is insufficient to ensure security 
on board energy carrying vessels and energy security  
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CHAPTER 4: REGIONAL FRAMEWORK AND INDUSTRY REGULATIONS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out the regional framework applicable in 
several regions around the globe that are plagued by piracy, more specifically South East 
Asia and Africa and analyse the laws, or the lack thereof, applicable to energy carrying 
vessels.  Regional agreements are useful to combat piracy and it can be said that they are 
complementary to article 100 of UNCLOS which states: 
“All States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the 
high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.”278 
The above Article imposes a positive obligation on states to take necessary steps to 
repress piracy. It does not delineate what steps need to be taken but cooperation is 
essential for the repression of piracy and it is therefore prudent for states to implement 
regional agreements to enable them to take such steps. Regional agreements and industry 
regulations have played a vital role in combating piracy and have often been used to fill 
the gaps in the international framework. From the overview of the international 
framework in the previous chapter it is clear that it fails to take into account the 
vulnerabilities of energy carrying vessels. Perhaps regional agreements are better suited 
to provide a bespoke framework, as regional agreements tend to be more flexible. Piracy 
requires flexibility, as it is not static but always evolving and differs from region to 
region. Therefore, regional agreements and industry regulation can be better adjusted for 
a specific region or vessel type, taking into account the common modus operandi of 
                                            
278 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 100. Full text available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.  
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pirates in the region, popular targets, core causes and other geopolitics within the region. 
The only shortfall with regional agreements and industry regulations is that they tend to 
be non-binding in nature and are therefore considered to be soft laws. ‘Soft law’ refers to 
“non-legally binding instruments used in contemporary international relations by states 
and international organisations.”279280 Not all regional agreements are non-binding and a 
distinction will be made where necessary. 
There are various regional treaties, codes and strategies in place. This chapter will 
focus on the regional framework in regions most affected by piracy and includes South 
East Asia and East and West Africa. Industry regulations tend to focus on specific 
regions and form part of the regional framework of that region. The regional framework 
will also include UN SC Resolutions and IMO Circulars, because although they are 
international, they have a regional application. As set out in chapter one, this chapter will 
cover several instruments, such as the ReCAAP, ReCAAP Guidelines, the Djibouti Code 
of Conduct, the BMP4, the GoG Guidelines, the 2050 AIMS, the Luanda Declaration, the 
Lomé Charter and the Yaoundé Declaration as well various UN SC Resolutions281 and 
IMO Resolutions and Circulars. It will become evident from the below overview of the 
regional framework, that there is lacuna in the legal system with regards to energy 
carrying vessels and although the Luanda Declaration focuses on energy security, it 
merely paves the way for states to take the necessary steps. Up until now, states have 
                                            
279 A Boyle ‘Soft law in international law-making’ in M. D. Evans (ed) International Law (2010) 124. 
280 The term ‘soft law’ is highly debated amongst scholars and there is no single agreed definition. For the 
purpose of this dissertation it merely refers to non-binding regulations as defined by A Boyle ibid. 
281 United Nations Security Counsel Resolutions 1816, 1838, 1846 and 1851.  Full Resolutions available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/piracy/piracy_documents.htm, accessed on 2 December 2017. 
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failed to take positive steps in accordance with the Luanda Declaration and as a result, 
energy carrying vessels continue to fall victim to attack.  
2. REGIONAL FRAMEWORK IN SOUTH EAST ASIA 
As stated above, regional agreements can be created to better suit the specific 
needs and problems of a region. UNCLOS would be insufficient to combat piracy in this 
region as most crimes occur within territorial waters of a state, due to the geographical 
location. SUA does not fill the gaps in this region because although it introduced various 
new crimes and dispensed with the high-sea and motive requirement, it has not been 
widely adopted.282 Some of the major states that have not adopted SUA are Indonesia, 
Thailand and Malaysia.283 To combat the high number of pirate and armed robbery 
incidents in the region, a proposal was made at The Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN)+3 Summit Meeting in November 2001 for a regional co-operation 
agreement to be implemented.+ 284  Drafting commenced in 2002 and ReCAAP was 
adopted on the 11th November 2004.285 To date ReCAAP has 20 contracting members.286 
ReCAAP aims to “promote and enhance cooperation against piracy and armed robbery in 
                                            
282 See chapter 3 at page 7. IMO ‘Status of multilateral Conventions and instruments in respect of which the 
International Maritime Organization or its Secretary-General performs depositary or other functions’ (13 
September 2017) at 420.Full text available from 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Documents/Status%20-
%202017.docx.pdf. 
283 Ibid at 422 – 424. 
284 ReCAAP “Enhancing regional cooperation: The Asian initiative” (ReCAAP presentation at the 
INTERTANKO workshop – security at sea) 16 May 2014 available at 
http://www.intertanko.com/upload/98799/ReCAAP.pdf, accessed on 2 December 2017. 
285 Ibid.  286 Member countries include Australia, People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, 
Kingdom of Cambodia, People’s Republic of China, Kingdom of Denmark, Republic of India, Japan, 
Republic of Korea, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Kingdom of 
the Netherlands, Kingdom of Norway, Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Singapore, 
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Kingdom of Thailand, United Kingdom, United States of 
America and Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. 
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Asia”.287 ReCAAP established the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC), which 
provides a platform to enable information sharing and cooperation. This concise 
agreement has only 22 Articles and is complementary UNCLOS. Perhaps this hinders the 
agreements effectiveness as the right of hot pursuit as provided in UNCLOS is unaltered 
and as such ReCAAP does not allow for cross-border pursuits in a region where states 
territorial waters are all within close proximity of one another.288 This allows pirates to 
easily escape by sailing into neighbouring states territorial waters. The agreement 
contains various other obligations, none of which are compulsory but rather encourage 
states to take certain steps.  
As stated in chapter 2, this area has the most reported incidents.289 In 2016 there 
was a total of 68 attacks, of which, 25% involved energy carrying vessels.290 This trend 
continued and in the first half of 2017 there was a total of 36 attacks, of which 42% 
involved energy carrying vessels.291 The problem has not gone unnoticed; ReCAAP 
released a Special Report on Incidents of Siphoning of fuel/oil at Sea in Asia in 2014 and 
2015 and in November 2015 published the ReCAAP Guidelines.292 The aim of the guide 
is to: 
                                            
287 ReCAAP Org Home Page available at http://www.recaap.org/, accessed on 2 December 2017. 
288 Taking into account the geographical set up in this region, cross border pursuit is perhaps necessary to 
prevent pirates from escaping by simply crossing into the territorial waters of a nearby state. However, this 
region has been rife with tension over territorial space and not allowing cross border pursuit respects state 
sovereignty and allows for better state-to-state relations. 
289 The area referred to includes Indonesia, the Malacca Straits, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore Straits and 
Thailand. 
290 ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the period 1 January – 31 December 
2016 
291 ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the period 1 January – 31 June 2017. 
292 Guide for Tankers Operating in Asia Against Piracy and Armed Robbery Involving Oil Cargo Theft 
(ReCAAP Guidelines). Full version available at 
http://www.recaap.org/Portals/0/docs/Reports/2015/Guide%20for%20Tankers%20Operating%20in%20Asi
a%20Against%20Piracy%20and%20Armed%20Robbery%20Involving%20Oil%20Cargo%20Theft.pdf. 
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“Illustrate the threat of piracy and armed robbery against ships (hereafter referred to as 
‘sea robbery’) in Asia, particularly incidents involving oil cargo theft; and to assist ships 
to avoid, deter or delay such incidents; as well as post-incident management.”293 
The ReCAAP Guide sets out various guidelines to assess risk and to prevent attacks 
taking into account the degree of risk applicable. The risk assessment takes into account 
reported incidents, focusing on the common modus operandi, the type and size of vessels 
and the cargo carried, which enables ship owners to assess the risk applicable by looking 
at the route travelled, the type of oil cargo carried and the size of the vessel. Figure 10 
below reflects a generic risk assessment table, which can be used by ship owners. The 
ReCAAP Guide sets out various preventative measures, which include but are not limited 
to, training crew to enable them to act as required when under threat, doing background 
checks on crew, ensuring that a proper ship security plan is in place, implementing ship 
protection measure which include installation of strong hardening measures such as 
barbed or razor wire barriers, spikes, water or foam sprayers or other recognised 
deterrents, especially in vulnerable points of entry, securing doors and hatches, 
reinforcing hatches with padlocks or other security measures, securing port holes and 
windows, designating and limiting the number of access points, implementing measures 
to block or lift external ladders, securing tools and equipment that can be used by pirates, 
installing alarms to warn crew and intruders, complying with the ISPS Code and BMP 4, 
installing a SSAS, installing emergency communication equipment, tracking devices, 
communications equipment, search light and lighting and close circuit television. The 
ReCAAP Guide provides checklists for the ship manager, company security officer, 
shipmaster and crew for before sailing, during sailing, during an attack and after an 
attack. Further, the ReCAAP Guide promotes information sharing, situational awareness 
                                            
293 Ibid at 1. 
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and co-ordination. It is up to owners to utilise available information and avoid high risk 
areas where possible or be aware of the risk and prepare adequately for it.294 
 During 2015 there were a total of 147 reported incidents in the South East Asia 
and approximately 33% of which involved energy carrying vessels. The above guidelines 
were published at the end of 2015 and in 2016 there was a drastic decrease in overall 
attacks, which decreased by just over 50%, with a total of 68 incidents reported. About 
25% involved energy carrying vessels. The decrease in attacks on energy carrying vessels 
is noteworthy but it is apparent that these vessels are still targeted because in the first half 
of 2017, although the overall number of attacks is the lowest it has been over the past five 
years, a total of 42% of the incidents that were reported involved energy carrying 
vessels.295 Only one incident involved the theft of cargo.+296 The only inference that can be 
drawn from that is that tankers are not only targeted for their fuel but because they are 
vulnerable and more susceptible to attack. From the high percentage of attacks involving 
energy carrying vessels it would appear that the ReCAAP Guidelines have not been 
entirely effective. This could be due to ship owner’s failure to comply with the 
recommendations, as the ReCAAP Guidelines are non-binding. 
 
 
 
                                            
294 Ibid. 
295 ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report 2017 op cit note 14. 
296 The C.P. 41, a product tanker was boarded by six pirates who took all the crew hostages. The pirates 
damaged the navigation and communication equipment before sailing the tanker to an unknown location 
where part of the diesel oil cargo was stolen and transferred to another boat. For the full report see ibid at 
33 & 34. 
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3. REGIONAL FRAMEWORK IN EAST AND WEST AFRICA 
Piracy has plagued both the East and West Coast of Africa and as a result, various 
regional agreements have been established to assist combat piracy.  Regional agreements 
generally focus either East Africa or West Africa, however, there are purely African 
initiatives which will also be discussed below and include the 2050 AIMS, the Luanda 
Declaration and the Lomé Charter. 
3.1 East Africa 
Somalia was severely affected by piracy in the past, today however, the epidemic 
appears to be contained. This does not mean that states and the shipping industry can 
Figure 10: Generic Risk Assessment Table (Source: ReCAAP Guide for Tankers 
Operating in Asia Against Piracy and Armed Robbery Involving Oil Cargo Theft) 
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become complacent because if they did, piracy would again flourish in the region. Due to 
the severity of piracy in this region, various codes and guidelines have been developed. 
The current legal framework in this region consists of the Djibouti Code of Conduct, the 
BMP, various UN SC Resolutions297 and IMO Resolutions and Circulars.  
The Djibouti Code of Conduct is an IMO initiative that provides a framework for 
co-operation and capacity building.298 The Djibouti Code is partially modelled after 
ReCAAP; however, it is not legally binding299 and it is not open to all states for 
signature.300 A total of 20 states, of the 21 states eligible to sign, have signed the Code. 
Briefly, the code provides for co-operation, assistance, incident reporting, co-ordination 
and information sharing between state participants. The Code encourages parties to 
implement ship protection measures and calls for states to review domestic legislation to 
enable effective detention, prosecution and extradition. The Code provides for the 
appointment of offices for the purpose of embarking suspected ships and sets out 
guidelines for the officers. Similarly, to UNCLOS301, it gives States and ship owners a 
right to claim damages arising from damage, injury or loss as a result of action taken in 
terms of the Code.302 As a regional agreement, the Djibouti Code was framed to suite the 
specific threat in that region. Somali pirates are known for taking ships hostage for 
                                            
297 UN SC Resolutions op cit note 4. 
298 The Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the 
Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (Djibouti Code of Conduct) Article 2. Full text available from 
https://www.prc.cm/files/f7/26/ec/8acea8ec3a597473a76bd03c76140019.pdf. 
299 Ibid Article 15(a). 
300 R Geiss, A Petrig Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: The Legal Framework for Counter-Piracy 
Operations in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden (2011) 49 & 50. 
301 UNCLOS op cit note 1 Article 106. 
302 The Djibouti Code op cit note 21. 
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ransom303 and a study of incidents in this region reveals no indication that energy 
carrying vessels are specifically targeted.304 It was therefore not necessary for the 
Djibouti Code to address the vulnerabilities of energy carrying vessels. What the Djibouti 
Code does demonstrate is the success of a Code designed to suit a specific problem 
taking into account all other relevant factors that are present and relate to threat. The 
Djibouti Code was designed to combat piracy in East Africa and was successful. A code 
designed to combat piracy against energy carrying vessels could be equally as successful. 
Several UN SC Resolutions have been passed, in terms of Chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter, on piracy off the coast of Somalia.305 These Resolutions have 
gone a long way to help the epidemic, even allowing States to enter the territorial waters 
of Somalia.306 The UN SC Resolutions have attempted to fill voids created by UNCLOS 
and as stated by Gottlieb “these resolutions (“the piracy resolutions”) form a multifaceted 
approach and contain a number of innovative elements.”307 Chapter VII empowers the 
UN SC to make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken in the event of 
“any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”308 Piracy has not 
expressly been labelled as a threat to the peace but rather that it “exacerbates the situation 
                                            
303 As stated by Gottlieb “The Somali piracy model is based on hijacking ships for ransom.” See Y Gottlieb 
“The security councils maritime piracy resolutions: a critical assessment” (2015) 24(1) Minnesota Journal 
of International Law 1 – 72 at 49. 
304 In saying that, it does not mean that energy carrying vessels are not affected in this region. The MV 
Sirius Star discussed in chapter 2 was taken hostage off the coast of Somalia and although not specifically 
targeted, any attack on an energy carrying vessel can have catastrophic consequences on the environment in 
the case of collision, grounding or any accident as well as the crew and the economy.   
305 Security Council resolution on piracy off the coast of Somalia are: 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008), 1838 
(2008), 1844 (2008) 1846 (2008), 1851 (2008), 1897 (2009), 1918 (2010) (this is the only resolution on 
Somali piracy that was not adopted under chapter VII), 1950 (2010), 1976 (2011), 2015 (2011), 2020 
(2011), 2077(2012), 2125 (2012), 2184 (2014) 2246 (2015), 2316 (2016), 2383 (2017). For full texts see op 
cit note 4. 
306 Ibid Resolution 1816. 
307 Y Gottlieb, op cit note 26 at 2. 
308 The United Nations Charter, Article 39. Full text available at https://www.un.org/en/charter-united-
nations/. 
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in Somalia which constitutes a threat to international peace and security in the region.”309 
By referring to piracy in this manner the UN SC acted cautiously as there had been no 
consensus among participating states that piracy was a threat to international peace and 
security.310 Considering the importance of energy security, any major threat to it would 
most likely disrupt international peace and security and justify intervention by the UN 
SC. Yet there are no provisions relating specifically to energy carrying vessels. Such a 
resolution could implement mandatory security measures, allow for private security on 
board and provide guidelines for entering into states territorial waters, when armed. 
Although, as stated above, energy carrying vessels are not specifically targeted in this 
area and therefore, intervention in this regard was not necessarily called for. However, in 
the GoG it is. This will be discussed in more detail below. In addition to UN SC 
resolutions there are numerous IMO Resolutions and Circulars on piracy in this region. 
None of the aforementioned addresses the vulnerabilities of energy carrying vessels but 
rather make recommendations and provides guidelines of a general nature.311 The IMO 
has published guidelines on the use of privately contracted armed security personnel 
when transiting High Risk Areas and importantly, recommended compliance with the 
BMP. 
                                            
309 Resolution 1816 op cit note 29. 
310 Y Gottlieb, op cit note 26 at 19. 
311 For a detailed list of all IMO publications see: IMO “Information resources on piracy and armed robbery 
against ships” available at 
http://www.imo.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/InformationResourcesOnCurrentTopics/PiracyandArmedRobber
yagainstShips/Documents/Information%20Resources%20on%20PIRACY%20AND%20ARMED%20ROB
BERY%20AGAINST%20SHIPS.pdf, accessed on 2 December 2017. 
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The BMP was developed by industry organisations312 to provide guidance to ship 
owners and charterers to “assist ships to avoid, deter or delay piracy attacks in the High-
Risk Area…”313 and is the first hands-on approach of protection to be developed. The 
BMP has been revised four times and the most recent edition, the BMP4, was published 
in August 2011.  The BMP4 contains three fundamental requirements. Firstly, states are 
required to register at the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA). 
Secondly, states are required to report to the United Kingdom Marine Trade Operations 
and thirdly, states are required to implement Ship Protection Measures (SPMs).314 The 
BMP4 provides general provisions to assist ship owners with security measures when 
transiting high-risk areas. Although supported by the IMO, these recommendations are 
non-binding.315 The BMP4 does not contain any specialised provisions relating 
specifically to energy carrying vessels but as stated above, there is no evidence that 
energy carrying vessels are targeted in this area and therefore it was not necessary to 
provide more specific and specialised provisions. This does not mean that energy-
carrying vessels are not at risk but a study of the ICC-IMB reports reveals that pirates in 
this region have not stolen fuel cargo during attacks. Although, oil tankers have been 
taken hostage for ransom, like the MV Sirius Star discussed in chapter 2, and are able to 
procure a high ransom. Any regulations relating specifically to energy carrying vessels 
                                            
312 Developed by BIMCO, ICS, INTERCARGO and INTERTANKO and signatories include BIMCO, 
CLIA, ICS, IGP&I, IMB, IMEC, INTERCARGO, InterManager, INTERTANKO, ISF, ITF, IPTA, JHC, 
JWC, OCIMF, SIGTTO, The Mission to Seafarers and WSC. See Steamship Mutual at 
https://www.steamshipmutual.com/loss-prevention/BMP4Piracy0811.htm, accessed on 2 December 2017. 
313 Best Management Practice 4 at 1. Full text available at http://www.mschoa.org/docs/public-
documents/bmp4-low-res_sept_5_2011.pdf?sfvrsn=0. 
314 Ibid at v. 
315 IMO Circular MSC. 1/1339 issued on 14th September 2014 encourages member states to make use of 
BMP. 
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would be applicable by vessel type and not region and therefore any risk in this region 
would be managed. 
3.2 West Africa 
Energy carrying vessels are at high risk in this region and more than half of the 
reported incidents for 2016 involved energy carrying vessels. Furthermore, this is an oil 
rich region with several oil producing states, which produce more than five million 
barrels of crude petroleum per day.316 As far back as 1983, the IMO published its first 
Resolution relating to piracy in this region.317 More recently when piracy in this region 
surpassed the Gulf of Aden, a United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
threat assessment report stated: 
“Much of the piracy that affects West Africa is a product of the disorder that surrounds 
the regional oil industry. A large share of the recent piracy attacks targeted vessels 
carrying petroleum products. These vessels are attacked because there is a booming black 
market for fuel in West Africa.”318 
Industry organisations, such as the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO), 
ICS, the International Association of Dry Cargo Ship-owners (INTERCARGO) and the 
International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO) responded by 
utilising the BMP4 and implementing the GoG Guidelines, which aims to “bridge the gap 
between the advice currently found in BMP4 and the prevailing situation in the GoG 
                                            
316 B Ki-moon, Secretary General, United Nations. Report of the United Nations Assessment Mission on 
Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea (7 to 24 November 2010), Letter dated 18 January 2012 at 11 available at 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/AUUN%20S%202012%2045.pdf, accessed on 2 December 2017. 
317 IMO Resolution A545 (13) “Measures to prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships” 
available at 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Guidance/Documents/A.545.pdf, accessed 
on 2 December 2017. 
318 UNODC “Transnational organized crime in West Africa: a threat assessment” (February 2013) available 
at http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_EN.pdf, accessed 
on 2 December 2017. 
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region.”319 The GoG Guidelines state which sections of the BMP4 apply, either partially 
or wholly, and where there are differences between the regions it offers guidelines and 
provides alternatives applicable to that region thus taking into account the modus 
operandi of pirates who operate in the GoG. The guidelines set out three categories of 
piracy, the one being ‘cargo theft’ and on it states: 
“This occurs throughout the area described and often occurs in or about the STS transfer 
areas where ships are particularly vulnerable. In the main it is related to product and 
chemical tankers but there are also regular attacks and thefts on general cargo carriers… 
Vessels are hijacked for several days and cargo is transferred to a smaller vessel. These 
incidents are well organised, often involving a criminal element with commercial 
interests ashore. Recent cargo thefts have demonstrated that pirates often have a maritime 
know-how allowing them to disable communications, operate the cargo system, etc.”320 
Like the BMP4, the GoG Guidelines are non-binding and therefore their effectiveness 
depends on whether and to what extent ship owners implement the necessary measures. 
As set out in chapter 2, in 2016 a shocking 51% of and in the first half of 2017, 37.5% of 
the incidents reported in this region involved energy carrying vessels. Theft of oil cargo 
has decreased drastically over the past few years but energy carrying vessels remain the 
most targeted vessel type. Perhaps ship owners have become complacent or do not wish 
to incur exorbitant costs implementing the BMP4 and would rather save the money and 
take their chances. Maybe the gravity of the problem and the grave risk to the economy, 
environment and crew has not yet been realised. Whatever the reason is, a possible 
solution is to make both the BMP4 and the GoG Guidelines compulsory on board energy 
carrying vessels. Ship owners do not have the same protection of the navy or private 
                                            
319 The Guidelines for Owners, Operators and Masters for Protection against Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea 
Region at 1. Full text available at http://www.ics-shipping.org/docs/default-source/Piracy-Docs/011014-
gog-guidelines-revised-version-for-release-2432EF577EBB.pdf?sfvrsn=6, accessed on 2 December 2017. 
320 Ibid at 4. 
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security in this region as they would in the Gulf of Aden and therefore it is necessary for 
ship owners to ensure that their ships are protected.321 
The UN SC Council has remained relatively quiet on the issue save for two 
resolutions passed, namely, resolution 2018 (2011) and 2039 (2012).322 Neither of which 
contain any binding provisions to effectively combat piracy. Rather, they encourage 
states and interregional organisations to lead the way providing only a fraction of the 
assistance that was given in the Gulf of Aden. The UN SC was correct to allow the GoG 
states and interregional organisations to deal with the problem, considering the difference 
in on land politics as opposed to Somalia. The GoG states are not willing to relinquish 
sovereignty over their territorial waters and allow foreign states and navies to patrol or 
use force. However, Somalia did not relinquish sovereignty. In fact, Somalia323 gave 
consent to the UN SC to pass the resolutions it did and each resolution reaffirmed the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, political impendence and unity of Somalia.324 
Considering the importance of energy to states, any major disruption to the supply of 
energy could cause significant tension and disrupt international peace. The GoG states 
have been unsuccessful at managing the threat and therefore should authorise the UN SC 
to provide assistance because although it is an “African problem”325, it negatively affects 
all states relying on this region for oil and all ship owners transiting this region. 
                                            
321 Polity New stated “Both the European Union (EU) and NATO have stated that they have no intentions 
to intervene militarily in the Gulf of Guinea.”  See “Pirates on the other side: Maritime piracy in the Gulf of 
Guinea” Polity 29 October 2013, available at http://m.polity.org.za/article/pirates-on-the-other-side-
maritime-piracy-in-the-gulf-of-guinea-2013-10-29, accessed on 2 December 2017. 
322 UN Org, op cit note 4. 
323 UN SC Resolution 1897 paragraph 8 “affirms … that such authorizations have been renewed only 
following the receipt of the letter dated 2 and 6 November 2009 conveying the consent of the TFG.” Ibid. 
324 UN SC Resolution 1846, 1851 and 1957 op cit note 4. 
325 The Gulf of Guinea countries have stated that they want an “African solutions for African problem” and 
all support should be given through the African union. See B Ki-moon, op cit note 39 at 17. 
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In accordance with the concern expressed in UN SC resolution 2018 and 2039, 
West and Central African countries established the Yaoundé Declaration.326 The Yaoundé 
Declaration is modelled after the Djibouti Code of Conduct, it is non-binding and 
provides recommendations and encourages states to take certain steps to repress piracy. 
The Yaoundé Declaration is not only applicable to the GoG but also provides a 
framework for Western and Central Africa and is a legal basis for co-operation between 
the signatory states of both regions. There are no provisions contained in the Yaoundé 
declaration that sets it apart from the Djibouti Code of Conduct and other similar 
agreements. It does not contain any provisions that specifically provide security measures 
for energy carrying vessels. Therefore, states have failed to take into account the entirely 
different nature of the crime of piracy in this region as well as the importance of energy 
security.  
3.3 African initiatives 
Africa was behind in maritime development and has been described as being sea 
blind, meaning it has been blind to the maritime domain and neglected its coastlines.327 
The 2050 AIMS328 was developed by the AU and is in line with the UN SC 2019. It was 
adopted on 31st January 2014. The 2050 AIMS is a revolutionary development for Africa 
and it is the first African initiative of this kind; paving the road for future development 
                                            
326 The code has been signed by Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, 
democratic republic of Congo, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, guinea, guinea Bissau, equatorial guinea, Liberia, 
Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, sierra, Leone, Sao tome, Principe and Togo. 
327 Institute for Security Studies available at https://issafrica.org/iss-today/from-missed-opportunity-to-
oceans-of-prosperity, accessed on 2 December 2017. 
328 According to Stockbrueger, 2050 AIMS “is one of the first true African effort to reclaim the continents 
maritime security agenda and to move it beyond the international counter-piracy agenda.” See J 
Stockbrueger “Reclaiming the Maritime? The AU’s new maritime strategy” Piracy-studies.org 2 February 
2014 available at http://piracy-studies.org/reclaiming-the-maritime-the-aus-new-maritime-strategy/ 
accessed on 15 October 2017. 
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not only with regards to security and piracy but also other maritime crimes, the 
environment, African development and the economy. The 2050 AIMS is optimistic, but it 
fails to pay due regard to on land problems, such as poor governance, corruption and 
marginalization, which will hinder the success of its purpose.329 The 2050 AIMS is an 
extensive document, covering various areas of concern, yet, there are no provisions that 
specifically address the high number of attacks on energy carrying vessels and it fails to 
provide mandatory measures to bridge the vulnerabilities of these ships. The transport of 
energy makes up a large portion of world trade, as set out in chapter 2, and therefore, for 
the 2050 AIM to achieve its purpose, it needs to strengthen the vulnerabilities of energy 
carrying vessels and secure the transport of energy. The Luanda Declaration330 takes the 
first steps towards energy security and achieving the purpose of the 2050 AIMS. 
The Luanda Declaration was adopted in October 2015 and is the first step in the 
right direction, paying much needed attention to the importance of energy security and 
the current lacuna in the framework. The preamble takes note of “the significance of 
maritime and energy security to states economic growth, development and stability” and 
recognizes “the existing relation between the maritime and energy security and the 
economic development …” It further highlights that “maritime and energy security is 
essential to safeguarding peace, stability, and development of what is called “Blue 
Economy” of the Coastal states, particularly in the GoG region.”331 It does not contain 
                                            
329 K.L. Jacobsen, J.R. Nordby “Maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea” (2015) Royal Danish Defence 
College Publishing House available at 
http://www.fak.dk/publikationer/Documents/Maritime%20Security%20in%20the%20Gulf%20of%20Guin
ea.pdf, accessed on 2 December 2017. 
330 The Luanda Declaration on Maritime and Energy Security (Luanda Declaration). Full text available at 
http://www.embangola-can.org/pdf/Mirex%20-
%20CISME%20Final%20Luanda%20Declaration%20English%209th%20Oct%202015.pdf. 
331 Ibid Preamble. 
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any mandatory security measures but rather it reiterates the importance of developing 
“complementary national, regional and continental maritime strategies to achieve shared 
goals and objectives”332 and “recommends that states prepare and strengthen their laws 
regarding maritime and energy security…”333 In accordance with the Luanda Declaration 
it is therefore up to each state to take the necessary steps to achieve maritime and energy 
security. However, many previous regulations have made recommendations and called on 
states to take positive steps. Not regarding maritime energy security but piracy in general. 
The problem lies in states’ inability to affect the necessary steps due to lack of resources, 
corruption and other inland problems. The Luanda Declaration is non-binding and 
therefore, although it is a major development in maritime energy security, it may not be 
as effective as intended. Its ineffectiveness is highlighted by the continued high number 
of attacks on energy carrying vessels in this region.334 As stated in an article “the 17 
countries lining the GoG have poor maritime surveillance capacities and they have been 
trying for several years to boost cooperation to clamp down on piracy.”335 
Another African initiative and the most recent336 is the adoption of the Lomé 
Charter.337 One of the most noteworthy developments is that The Lomé Charter is 
recognised as an international treaty as defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
                                            
332 Ibid para 1.2. 
333 Ibid para 2.5. 
334 Refer to chapter 2. 
335 AFP “African Union adopts charter on piracy, illegal fishing” Sowetan Live 16 October 2016 available 
at https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2016-10-16-african-union-adopts-charter-on-piracy-illegal-fishing/, 
accessed on 2 December 2017. 
336 The Lomé Charter was adopted on 15 October 2016 by heads of state and governments of the AU. 
337 The African Union, the African Charter on Maritime Security Safety and Development in Africa (Lomé 
Charter), 15 October 2016. Full text available at https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/33128-treaty-
0060_-_lome_charter_e.pdf, accessed on 2 December 2017. 
 99 
Treaties and is therefore binding on state signatories under international law. 338 The fact 
that this charter is binding is a major improvement on the framework and was described 
by the Defenseweb as “ground-breaking”.339 However, the overall success of the charter 
rests on states to effectively implement it. The objective of the Lomé Charter is to, inter 
alia, “prevent and suppress national and transnational crime, including terrorism, piracy, 
armed robbery against ships…”340, to “promote and enhance cooperation in the fields of 
maritime domain awareness, prevention by early warning and fight against piracy, armed 
robbery against…”341 and to “establish appropriate national, regional and continental 
institutions and ensure the implementation of appropriate policies likely to promote 
safety and security at sea.”342 Chapter II of the charter focuses on measures to prevent and 
combat crimes at sea and encourages states to take steps, sets responsibilities on state 
parties and encourages harmonization and cooperation. Any responsibilities on states are 
undertaken in accordance with their own realities and therefore are not onerous. Even if 
they were onerous, there is no real way to enforce states compliance. Further, if a charter 
or convention is overly onerous, states tend to not adopt it. Only time will tell whether or 
not states will take the necessary steps to achieve its aims. Unfortunately, the Lomé 
charter does not incorporate the Luanda Declaration or other security provisions relating 
specifically to energy carrying vessels. 
                                            
338 O Oladipo “Cooperation as a tool for enhancing state capacity to fulfill obligations of the Lomé Charter” 
African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes 12 October 2017 available at 
http://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/cooperation-tool-enhancing-state-capacity-fulfill-obligations-
lome-charter/, accessed on 2 December 2017. 
339 ISS Africa “Fulfilling the promise of the Lomé maritime summit” Defence Web 25 October 2016 
available at 
http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=45680:fulfilling-the-
promise-of-the-lome-maritime-summit&catid=108:maritime-security&Itemid=233, accessed on 2 
December 2017. 
340 Lomé Charter op cit note 60, Article 3(a). 
341 Ibid Article 3(d) 
342 Ibid Article 3(e) 
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4. CONCLUSION 
Regional agreements have been used to build on the international framework and 
fill apparent gaps, however, they have not always been successful as they are non-binding 
and often, states do not have sufficient resources to take the necessary steps. The above 
overview focused on regional agreements and industry regulations in regions most 
affected by piracy, that being Asia and Africa.  
The ReCAAP was implemented to combat piracy in the oceans of Asia. Energy 
carrying vessels in this region are targeted and their fuel cargo stolen. Although, incidents 
involving oil theft have been far less in the past year, energy carrying vessels remain the 
most targeted vessel type, highlighting their vulnerabilities. Yet, there are no provisions 
in ReCAAP that provide for security on board energy carrying vessels. ReCAAP 
recognised the gap and implemented the ReCAAP Guidelines, which are focused on the 
prevention of oil theft to be applied to tankers by owners. The ReCAAP Guidelines focus 
on assessing the risk and implementing various measures to mitigate such risk. It also sets 
out various procedural steps for pre-sailing, during sailing, in the event of attack and 
post-incident reporting. Unfortunately, the Guidelines are not mandatory, and many ship 
owners may decide not to implement measures in order to save costs. Also, most owners 
are paying for insurance that covers loss from piracy and therefore they may feel that it is 
not necessary to incur additional expenses on preventative measures.  
The Gulf of Aden and Somalia has the most extensive framework, consisting of 
the Djibouti Code, the BPM4 and several UN SC and IMO Resolutions. The framework 
 101 
has been effective and piracy in the Gulf of Aden is currently under control. 343 None of 
the aforementioned framework contains provisions relating specifically to energy 
carrying vessels but there is no evidence to show that they are specifically targeted in this 
zone and it is therefore not necessary. Although there are no provisions that apply 
specifically to energy carrying vessels, the framework in place applies when transiting 
this region. The Djibouti Code, UN SC and IMO Resolutions generally encourage states 
to take certain necessary steps and co-operate amongst each other in order to suppress 
piracy.  On the other hand, the BMP4 provide ship-hardening mechanisms and is a hands-
on approach for ship owners to assess the risk and apply necessary steps to deter pirates. 
The BMP4 apply to all vessel types. It is therefore up to owners of energy carrying 
vessels to assess the risk, taking into account inherent ship vulnerabilities, the route 
traveled and the value and volatility of the cargo carried, and apply appropriate hardening 
mechanisms. 
Energy carrying vessels are at a high risk in the GoG. This region is rich in oil 
reserves and as a result, tankers are drawn there to transport oil. In line with UN SC 
resolution 2018 and 2039, which once again, merely recognises the problem of piracy in 
the region and encourages states to take necessary steps, GoG states established the 
Yaoundé Declaration. The Yaoundé declaration is similar to the Djibouti Code and in a 
region where energy carrying vessels are targeted, fails to provide provisions that counter 
the vulnerabilities of these vessels. Apart from its failure to provide for security on board 
                                            
343 Some authors are of the opinion that operations put into place in the Gulf of Aden are not sustainable in 
the long terms and that a failure to deal with the root causes of piracy will result in its resurgence in the 
near future or once operations cease. This debate falls beyond the scope of this dissertation. What is 
important is that the framework in place has been successful, despite on land problems. Of course on land 
problems cannot be ignored but they fall within states sovereignty and not much can be done by other 
states. Also, change on land could take years and in the interim, a sufficient framework needs to be in 
place. 
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energy carrying vessels, it also fails to implement any mandatory provisions to suppress 
piracy. States are once again merely encouraged to take certain steps and cooperate 
amongst each other. The GoG Guidelines read with the BMP4, applies the BMP4 to the 
GoG bridging any gaps where there are differences between the two regions. Similarly, to 
the BMP4, this provides a hands-on approach for ship owners to protect their vessels. 
However, they are not mandatory and ship owners may not want to incur costs 
implementing the recommended measures. The GoG Guidelines read with the BMP4 
should be compulsory in this region as it is clear that state security is insufficient.  
 African initiatives include the 2050 AIMS, Luanda Declaration and Lomé 
Charter. The 2050 AIMS is the first truly African initiative of its type and has paved the 
way for great development by African countries. Both the Luanda Declaration and Lomé 
Charter were created in accordance with the 2050 AIMS. The most notable one is the 
Luanda Declaration, its primary focus being maritime and energy security. The Luanda 
Declaration recognises the interconnectedness between maritime security and energy 
security and provides a framework for states to take the necessary steps to achieve 
maritime and energy security. Although this is an immense step in the right direction, it is 
non-binding and states are under no obligation to take steps as set out in the Declaration.  
In conclusion, the current regional framework in place in Asia and Africa is 
lacking binding laws that, firstly to ensure the states implement national legislation that is 
adequate to protect energy carrying vessels.344 Secondly, set out mandatory provisions on 
states, ship owners and other actors that bridge the vulnerabilities of energy carrying 
                                            
344 As stated in the previous chapter, there is no international court or tribunal empowered to deal with the 
crime of piracy and pirates are subject to the domestic laws of the state exercising jurisdiction. Therefore, 
states must have adequate domestic laws. 
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vessels. Thirdly, to coordinate various anti-piracy activities, including patrolling, training 
and escort’s through high-risk areas. Provisions recommending the aforesaid security 
measure can be found in various codes, declarations and resolutions. They are however 
not specific to energy carrying vessels. Further, they are not mandatory and therefore 
states have failed to take the necessary steps and effectively implement them in relation 
to energy carrying vessels. As a result, energy carrying vessels remain the most targeted 
vessel type, endangering the environment, the lives of crew and the economy.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation provided a study of the legal framework in place to suppress 
piracy on board energy carrying vessels and aimed to establish whether the current 
framework is sufficient, taking into account the vital role of energy to all societies and the 
alarmingly high number of incidents involving energy carrying vessels. This chapter will 
provide an overview of this dissertation, highlighting the aim and key findings. It will 
also set out recommendations for future studies. Finally, this chapter will conclude in 
finding that the current framework is insufficient.  
2. SUMMARY AND KEY FINDINGS 
There are various different Conventions and Codes on piracy that make up the 
legal framework. The maritime security framework is found in three main conventions, 
UNCLOS, SUA and SOLAS. UNCLOS Articles 100 to 110 contains dedicated 
provisions on piracy. SUA is an anti-terrorist convention and SOLAS is primarily 
focused on safety at sea. However, each has provisions can be used to suppress acts of 
piracy. The international framework is not vessel specific but rather applies to energy 
carrying vessels if the requirements of each instrument are met. UNCLOS provides a 
definition for piracy and confers on states universal jurisdiction whereas SUA sets out 
various criminal acts broad enough to include piratical acts. UNCLOS and SUA 
establishes jurisdiction for states; jurisdiction differs in each. UNCLOS establishes 
universal jurisdiction as opposed to SUA that requires a nexus between the state 
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exercising jurisdiction and the crime. States are given certain rights to assist with 
bringing criminals to justice, which criminals are subject to the domestic laws of the state 
exercising jurisdiction. SOLAS contains certain security provisions and sets out various 
responsibilities on states that are aimed to assist with security. Further, it gives effect to 
the ISPS Code. In this framework, only SUA Article 3bis read with the SUA PROT 
Protocol pays regard to the vulnerabilities of energy structures and vessels. This article 
does not, however, apply to piracy, as the purpose of the crime is to intimidate a 
population, a government or other body. It was therefore established that there was no 
international framework that applied specifically to energy carrying vessels and the 
general framework is not sufficient as it fails to take into account the importance of 
energy, the possible consequences of attacks on the economy, not only on direct 
participants but also on end users, the safety of crew and the environment as well as the 
vulnerabilities of energy carrying vessels. The inadequacy of the framework is 
emphasised by the high number of incidents involving energy carrying vessels.  
The regional framework consisting of inter-state regional agreements, codes and 
industry regulations provides more for interstate relations and encourages states to 
cooperate and take certain steps. The high number of incidents on energy carrying vessels 
resulted in more tanker specific guidelines being issued. The Luanda Declaration is 
focused on energy and maritime security. On a regional and industry level, a framework 
relating specifically to energy carrying vessels exists, however, from the high number of 
incidents it is evident that it has not been effective. The Luanda Declaration merely paves 
the way, calling on states to take steps to ensure energy and maritime security. This 
Declaration also demonstrates the need to address the research question advanced in this 
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dissertation. In line with the Luanda Declaration states have to implement the framework 
to achieve the end goal. The Luanda Declaration and guidelines relating to energy 
carrying vessels are non-binding on both states and ship owners and therefore the 
effectiveness of these instruments depends on states and ship owners. This is not ideal, as 
states have no external pressure and time frame to deal with on land issues, such as 
corruption and lack of resources, to enable them to implement the Luanda Declaration, as 
well as other declarations that also apply to energy carrying vessels although not 
specifically. Ship owners are under no obligation to implement the guidelines, which are 
often costly to implement.  The non-binding nature of regional instruments results in poor 
implementations, which in turn causes the framework to be ineffective. 
3. RECOMMENDATIONS 
From the previous chapters it is evident that there are several instruments 
applicable to energy carrying vessels. However, considering the high number of attacks 
on energy carrying vessels it is clear that the framework is insufficient. Recognising that 
the framework is currently insufficient to ensure security on board energy carrying 
vessels, there are several recommendations that the writer believes would improve 
security. Firstly, protective measures, such as vessel-hardening tactics, need to be 
mandatory on-board energy carrying vessels. Currently, vessel hardening tactics are not 
mandatory and ship owners often elect to save costs by not installing hardening 
mechanisms, especially because they are already paying the cost of insurance which will 
cover their loss in any event. This fails to take into account the vast collateral damage 
caused by attacks, such as the risk to the economy, the environment and the safety of the 
crew. Hardening tactics will help decrease the vulnerabilities of energy carrying vessels, 
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making it harder for pirates to attack. Secondly, guidelines relating to security should be 
mandatory for energy carrying vessels. The ReCAAP Guidelines are the most appropriate 
example of guidelines that should be enforced. Mandatory provisions will ensure that the 
required steps are taken, which will bridge the vulnerabilities of energy carrying vessels. 
As set out in chapter 2, energy carrying vessels are vulnerable and it is clear that the 
current framework does not take those vulnerabilities into account. Thirdly, the use of on 
board security guards should be encouraged. Guards do not necessarily have to be armed 
with deadly weapons but can make use of rubber bullets, pepper spray bullets and other 
effective deterrents. Lastly, because of the geographic location of pirate high-risk areas, 
which tend to be in close proximity of several states territorial waters, it is essential to 
have cross boarder pursuit agreements in place.  Unfortunately, pirates are able to escape 
relatively easily by sailing into neighbouring states territorial waters. Cross boarder 
agreements could be difficult for states to agree on as it interferes with states sovereignty. 
However, it could be agreed that it is allowed in certain circumstances and the state is 
notified immediately and allowed to take over as seen as they reach the parties.  
The Luanda Declaration is the most noteworthy convention as it focuses on 
maritime energy security. Any sequel study to this dissertation should set out the steps 
that need to be taken to achieve its objectives and canvass the steps that have been taken 
by states. It should also cover the effectiveness of such steps to achieving energy and 
maritime security. It is important to recognise the states that take positive steps and the 
steps that they have taken to allow other states to learn and follow from them.  
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4. CONCLUSION 
The current legal framework in place is not sufficient to establish maritime energy 
security. At an international level, energy carrying vessels are subject to the legal 
framework applicable to all vessel types and there are no provisions that apply 
specifically to energy carrying vessels. At a regional and industry level, there are various 
instruments that apply specifically to energy carrying vessels, they are however not 
mandatory and as a result have been ineffective. Energy carrying vessels are manifestly 
distinguishable from other vessels. They travel set routes through chokepoints and narrow 
straits that often cannot be avoided due to the geographical location of energy sources. 
Many of the chokepoints and narrow straits are affected by piracy as ships are forced to 
slow down and pirates are able to use this to their advantage. Energy carrying vessels are 
also more vulnerable. They are huge, slow moving, have few crew and low to the water 
when fully laden. Energy carrying vessels carry some of the most precious cargo, as 
societies depend on energy to grow their economy and develop. Energy sources are a 
desirable cargo to pirates, as they can use it to further their operations or sell it on the 
black market. Due to the physical and economic nature of energy, the effects of attacks 
tend to be amplified.345 This dissertation contends that energy carrying vessels require a 
regime that takes into account the nature and value of energy and the vulnerabilities of 
energy carrying vessels and the frequency of incidents involving energy carrying vessels 
further evidenced this. 
 
                                            345+See+chapter+2+for+explanation.+
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